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The presumption that parents act in their children's interests governs both
daily life and legal doctrine. This Article demonstrates that this presumption,
while usually correct, is problematic when unquestioned because it masks any
conflict between parents and children and is at odds with the individualistic
framework of the ethical rules governing attorneys. This harms families and puts
attorneys at risk. This Article explores this representation problem in the
previously largely ignored context of special education for children with
disabilities. The Supreme Court, in Winkelman v. Parma City School District,
recently established that parents and children each have substantive yet
"intertwined" rights to a child's appropriate education. Nonetheless, courts and
attorneys continue to assume that parents speak for children, even in cases with a
high risk of conflict.
To best serve families and protect attorneys, this Article proposes a novel
reconception of representation in education cases. Family representation posits
the family as the client, with the attorney owing duties to each member
individually and as part of the group. A family representation framework brings
four real-world benefits: (1) it recognizes the interconnected nature of the
relationships and rights of parents and children; (2) it engages both parties in the
process, which is particularly important for children who have previously been
overlooked; (3) it is economical in that it increases the number of represented
parties but not the number of attorneys; and (4) it brings attorney practice into
accord with ethical standards. This model has ramifications beyond the
educational sphere as it could also be fruitfully applied in torts and benefits
actions by a parent and child against the state or other third party. Ultimately,
* Instructor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. J.D., Harvard Law School; B.A., Harvard University. I am
grateful to Miriam Baer, Anita Bernstein, Naomi Cahn, Cara Chambers, Marsha Garrison, Christine Gottlieb,
Kristin Henning, Elisa Hyman, Ted Janger, Aliza Kaplan, Katherine Locker, Russell Pearce, Eric Pitt, Jayne
Ressler, Joan Shaughnessy, Elizabeth Schneider, and Barbara Bennett Woodhouse for their thoughtful
comments and encouragement on this project. I am also grateful to the organizers and participants in the
Family/Children & Law Junior Faculty Workshop at William and Mary School of Law; the Oregon Child
Advocacy Project Conference at the University of Oregon School of Law; and the Junior Faculty Workshop at
Brooklyn Law School for the opportunity to present and discuss this project. This project was supported by the
Brooklyn Law School Dean's Summer Research Stipend Program, with particular thanks to Dean Joan Wexler.
Excellent research assistance was provided by Kate Wood, David Shapiro, and Luis Morales. Finally, I thank
Kate Sullivan and the staff of The Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics for their careful and thoughtful editing.
@ 2011, Cynthia Godsoe.
303
THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS
reconceiving the attorney's role as representing the family while respecting the
voices of each member harmonizes the competing principles of individual
autonomy and family unity to the benefit of parents, children, and attorneys.
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INTRODUCTION
A mother seeks damages for a doctor's malpractice on behalf of her
six-year-old daughter. A father files a claim for his disabled ten-year-old to
receive social security insurance (SSI). A couple enrolls their two teenaged
children in a private school.
In each of these instances, we assume that the parents' interests are aligned
with those of their children. This presumption governs both daily life and our
legal system: Parents are empowered to act in their children's interests and
deemed to be the primary guardians of their legal rights. Although correct most of
the time, this presumption can become problematic when a family seeks legal
assistance as it both silences the child's voice-masking potential conflict
between parents and children-and is at odds with the ethical standards
governing attorneys.
This Article explores the disjunction between the presumption of aligned
interests between parents and children ("the presumption") and the individualis-
tic client representation model in the context of special education and proposes
changes in legal ethics to better serve families. Education is of pivotal importance
to both parents and children: A child needs it to grow into a healthy and
THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETmcs
successful adult, while a parent has a fundamental right to direct her child's
education. The dual nature of the interest in education is further reflected in the
governing statutory systems, in particular the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Improvement Act (IDEIA) governing the education of children with
disabilities-a 25 billion dollar program serving over six and a half million
children.' The IDEIA guarantees disabled children publicly-funded, appropriate
educational placements, mainstreamed in general education to the maximum
extent possible, and grants parents procedural rights to enforce their children's
entitlements to such an education. The Supreme Court in Winkelman v. Parma
City School District recently further highlighted this presumed alignment of
interests by clarifying that the child's right and the parent's right under the IDEIA
are "intertwined." 2
Because both parents and children have substantive rights under the IDEIA,
special education differs from most situations where attorneys represent children
or parents. On the one hand, children are entitled to their own attorneys or
guardians ad litem3 ("GALs") in situations where they have significant interests
at stake that often differ from those of their parents, such as abuse/neglect and
delinquency cases. On the other hand, parents are entitled to make decisions for
their children in non-IDEIA education matters, even decisions that go against the
children's interests and wishes,4 and they routinely direct attorney representation
on behalf of their children in civil matters to recover damages or benefits. Yet the
entitlement to an appropriate educational placement under the IDEIA gives
children rights they do not have in regular education and renders this situation
more nuanced and complex than the average civil matter involving children-a
child's school setting is second only to her home in its impact on her life.
Nonetheless, children's voices are often still ignored in this realm-and conflicts
between parents and children under-identified, due to the presumption that their
interests align.5 To return to one of the examples above, suppose one of the
1. Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482 (2006). Although the
name of the statute was changed to IDEIA when it was amended in 2004, many courts and advocates still refer
to it by its former name IDEA (Individuals with Disabilities Education Act).
2. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 534 (2007). The Court also clarified, however, that a
parent has an independent substantive right to her child's education. Id.
3. A guardian ad litem or GAL is a special guardian appointed by the court to represent a minor in litigation.
The GAL may be an attorney or a layperson, depending upon the rules of the jurisdiction making the
appointment. Even if the GAL is an attorney, her role is often not the traditional attorney role-rather than
advocating for the client's wishes, she advocates based upon the client's best interests. There is some confusion
about the GAL's role, and attorneys are sometimes appointed to represent children in a hybrid GAL/counsel
role. See infra notes 78, 193-94 and accompanying text.
4. For instance, a parent can choose to send his daughter to a parochial school, preferring the disciplinary
policies or single-sex nature of the school, even if the child would benefit academically from enrollment in a
highly regarded public high school.
5. I do not argue that the presumption is wrong because most of the time in these cases, it is not. I contend,
instead, that the presumption should 'not be unquestioned so that children's voices are not heard out of the
assumption that parents speak for them. If left unquestioned, the presumption would justify itself via flawed
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teenagers enrolled in private school by her parents has a mild learning disability
and is thus eligible for educational services under the IDEIA. Frustrated with the
sixteen-year-old's behavior outside of school, such as her sexual activity and
alcohol use, and wanting respite from caring for two teenagers, the parents
advocate for her to be placed in a restrictive residential "behavior management"
school out-of-state, although the child could be appropriately educated at many
other schools in her community. The child opposes the residential placement. The
attorney for the parents and child, however, follows the parents' direction with no
independent investigation, assuming they would only act in their child's interests.
The hearing officer for the IDEIA case makes the same assumption and,
mistakenly believing that the attorney has spoken with the child, does not hear
from the child herself. The child is sent to the residential school where her
academic performance suffers and she repeatedly tries to run away. In this way,
the failure of attorneys and fact-finders to hear children's views and to recognize
real conflicts between parents and children in the educational sphere can result in
harm to the child and ethical violations by attorneys.
The presumption of aligned interests embodied in substantive law also clashes
with the individualistic structure of attorney practice standards.6 The ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules") and other practice standards
presume the attorney's undivided loyalty to her client, disfavor joint representa-
tion, and make no exception for family relationships. This framework is at odds
with the reality that the presumption of aligned interests is correct much of the
time and that it is economically unfeasible to have separate counsel for each
IDEIA-eligible child and his parent. The Model Rules' broad definition of conflict
also fails to account for the practical reality that a successful educational plan
needs the buy-in of both the child and the parent. This disjuncture not only
impacts families negatively but also puts attorneys at risk for failing to meet their
duties to clients.
How to represent families ethically has been the subject of considerable
discussion by legal scholars and practitioners. Scholars have debated whether the
family should be represented as a communal unit or whether its members must be
treated as unconnected individuals under the Model Rules.' Scholars have also
circular reasoning-the children do not disagree so the presumption must be correct-but any disagreement
would never be uncovered since children's views are not aired. See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
6. Scholars have noted this disjuncture in other contexts, such as the joint representation of spouses. See, e.g.,
Russell G, Pearce, Family Values and Legal Ethics: Competing Approaches to Conflicts in Representing
Spouses, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 1253, 1277-79 (1994); Naomi Cahn & Robert Tuttle, Dependency and
Delegation: The Ethics of Marital Representation, 22 SEATrLE U. L. REv. 97, 98 (1998) ("[A]ny representation
involving multiple parties causes problems for the typical account of representation and ... marital representa-
tion brings its own peculiar difficulties because of the intimacy and dependency that characterize marriage.").
7. See, e.g., Pearce, supra note 6 (advocating family representation); Cahn & Tuttle, supra note 6 (same);
Teresa Stanton Collett, The Ethics of Intergenerational Representation, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 1453 (1994)
(concluding that family representation poses risks to the weaker family members and attorneys); Geoffrey C.
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discussed the proper role of parents and attorneys in cases involving children.8 To
align practice standards with the reality of families, some commentators have
proposed a communal "family" representation model, in which an attorney views
the family as a whole, rather than any individual member, as the client, and
accordingly construes conflicts strictly to permit expanded joint representation. 9
I argue for an application of the family representation model to parents and
children in education cases.' 0 In doing so, I seek to expand the discussion of
family representation and the relationship between attorneys, children, and their
parents. I aim to do so in three ways. First, the scholars outlining family
representation models have thus far considered only adult family members, either
spouses or parents and their adult children. This Article seeks to fill in the gap by
discussing the unique issues raised in the co-representation of parents and minor
children. And although commentators have identified problems. in the dual
representation of parents and children in the abuse/neglect and delinquency
realms," little attention has been paid to this issue in the education law context.' 2
Second, looking at conflicts in the education realm-where the parties'
interests are complex and separate yet intertwined-can bring a richer understand-
ing of the determination of conflicts and the nature of representation in other
types of cases involving parents and children. Although I focus on the education
context here, the family representation model is not so limited-rather, where
there is no absolute conflict between parents and children, as in abuse and neglect
matters for instance, families could benefit from more communal representation.
A family representation model could thus be fruitfully applied to other cases,
such as those in which a parent and child seek state benefits or bring an action in
tort or contract to recover against a third party.
Third, from a normative perspective, an expanded representation model brings
Hazard, Jr., Conflict of Interest in Estate Planning for Husband and Wife, 20 PRon. LAw. 1, 3 (1994) (opposing
family representation).
8. See, e.g., Kristin Henning, It Takes a Lawyer to Raise a Child?: Allocating Responsibilities Among
Parents, Children, and Lawyers in Delinquency Cases, 6 NEV. L.J. 836 (2006); Martin Guggenheim, How
Children's Lawyers Serve State Interests, 6 NEV. L.J. 805 (2006).
9. For a further elaboration of these models, see discussion infra at pp. 342-44. Family representation
proposals have largely been in the estate-planning context. See, e.g., Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of
Radical Individualism, 65 TEx. L. REv. 963 (1987); Pearce, supra note 6. Scholars have also noted the
increasing use of collaborative lawyering in family law and other matters involving children. See, e.g., Clare
Huntington, Repairing Family Law, 57 DuKE L.J. 1245, 1288 (2008); Kristin Henning, Loyalty, Paternalism,
and Rights: Client Counseling Theory and the Role of Child's Counsel in Delinquency Cases, 81 NOTRE DAME
L. REv. 245, 317-20 (2005) (arguing for the utility of collaborative lawyering in delinquency cases).
10. I use the term education cases to mean IDEIA cases, which form a large part of education litigation.
11. Recommendations of the Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal Representation of Children, 64
FoRDHAM L. REv. 1301, 1318 (1996) [hereinafter Fordham Recommendations]; Henning, supra note 8.
12. The few commentators who have addressed potential conflicts between parents and children in education
cases did so pre-Winkleman. See Kim Brooks Tandy & Teresa Heffernan, Representing Children with
Disabilities: Legal and Ethical Considerations, 6 NEV. L.J. 1396 (2006); Nancy J. Moore, Conflicts ofInterest in
the Representation of Children, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1819 (1996).
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significant real-world benefits: It recognizes the reality of family structures,
increases the child's participation in educational advocacy, which is often lacking
under the current system, and brings attorney practice into accord with ethical
standards. Rethinking the attorney's role as representing the family while
respecting the voices of each member thus harmonizes the competing principles
of individual autonomy and family unity underlying the representation of parents
and children.
This Article is divided into three Parts. Part I discusses the presumption that
parental interests are aligned with those of their children. It illustrates how this
presumption underlies the IDEIA statutory framework and how the recent
Winkelman decision further strengthened parental rights in the education realm. It
also discusses how attorneys' adherence to the presumption can obscure the
child's voice. Part H demonstrates that there are sometimes conflicts between
parents and children in education cases, but that most of these go unrecognized.
Part III proposes an expanded array of representation options for families. It
begins by outlining the individualistic framework of the Model Rules and
exploring the weaknesses of this framework. It then describes family representa-
tion and argues that this model can be effectively applied to the parent and child
dyad in education cases, as it reflects the intertwined nature of their entitlements,
engages both parties in the process, reduces conflict, and is pragmatic and
economical. Allowing families greater choice in how their representation will be
structured-individually or communally-will best ensure that attorneys achieve
appropriate educational placements for eligible children while also meeting their
ethical obligations.
I. PRESUMPTION THAT THE INTERESTS OF PARENTS AND CHILDREN ARE
ALIGNED IN EDUCATION CASES
Parents have an unparalleled interest in and ability to care for their children.
Indeed, the premise that "natural bonds of affection lead [them] to act in the best
interests of their children" governs our legal system.13 Accordingly, parents have
tremendous discretion to choose how their children will be raised. 14 The
presumption is particularly strong in the case of education; the Supreme Court
has repeatedly affirmed parents' fundamental right to "control the education of
13. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979); see also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 69 (2000)
(recognizing a parent's right to raise her children as she sees fit as "perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty
interests recognized" in our country and citing the "traditional presumption that a fit parent will act in the best
interest of his or her child").
14. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 72-73 (affirming as unconstitutional an order granting grandparents visitation
with grandchildren over the mother's objection because there was no allegation that the parent was unfit and
thus the decision about visitation was hers to make).
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their own."' 5
The presumption forms the dominant narrative of parents and children in part
because it is correct much of the time-children, especially younger ones,
depend upon their adult family members for "identity, affection, and belong-
ing,"16 in addition to the more practical realities of physical care and, to a large
degree, access to education." In return, parents usually know the most about
what their children like and need and offer valuable advice and assistance in
many different situations, including involvement with the legal system.18 Yet the
presumption is also based upon the societal construct of even older adolescents as
incapable of having a voice and children's historical treatment as the property of
their parents.' 9 Forty years ago in his dissenting opinion in Wisconsin v. Yoder,
Justice Douglas pointed out that a parent's views may conflict with a youth's own
wishes and called for a greater consideration of children's views and interests in
education issues. 2 0 The strength of the presumption, however, leads many
attorneys and courts to continue to assume that parents' and children's interests
are aligned without hearing from the children themselves or counsel representing
them. This Part outlines the doctrinal underpinnings of that presumption and how
these underpinnings influence attorney practice in education cases to overlook
both children's voices and potential conflicts.
15. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923) (holding that parents may choose to have their children
taught a language in addition to English in school); see also Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)
(holding that parents have the right to select their children's school); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232
(1972) ("[The] primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate
as an enduring American tradition."). Of course, this presumption assumes that both parents agree on what is in
the child's interest. There are numerous issues raised when the parents disagree about the child's educational
plan. This Article will assume, however, that if there are two parents with legal custody, they agree on the
educational plan for their child.
16. Annette Ruth Appell, Representing Children Representing What?: Critical Reflections on Lawyering for
Children, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. RE. 573, 625 (2008).
17. This dependence may be heightened for some of the children who are eligible for IDEIA protections, as
they are by definition disabled, and may be more dependent upon adults in their life than typically developing
youth.
18. See Henning, supra note 8, at 839-41 (discussing, in the delinquency context, the dependence of children
upon their parents for guidance and effective decision-making throughout a case and the therapeutic and
rehabilitative value of parental involvement); see also Christine Gottlieb, Children's Attorneys' Obligation to
Turn to Parents to Assess Best Interests, 6 NEV. L.J. 1263, 1263 (2006) ("[I]f you want to figure out what is best
for a child, ask her parents.").
19. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?": Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33
WM. & MARY L. REv 995 (1992).
20. Yoder, 406 U.S at 244 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("On this important and vital matter of education, I think
the children should be entitled to be heard. While the parents, absent dissent, normally speak for the entire
family, the education of the child is a matter on which the child will often have decided views.").
REPRESENTATION OF PARENTS AND CHILDREN
A. ALIGNED INTERESTS UNDER THE IDEIA
1. PARENT AS CHILD'S NATURAL ADVOCATE UNDER THE STATUTORY SCHEME
The special education statutory scheme reflects this general presumption that a
parent's and her child's interests are aligned.21 Thus, although the IDEIA grants
children with disabilities 22 aged three to twenty-one the right to a "free
appropriate public education" (FAPE),23 it guarantees this right by according
procedural protections to both parents and children. 24 The system works as
follows: Once a child is deemed eligible by an evaluation designating her a child
with a disability in one of the covered categories,2 5 the family and school
collaboratively develop an educational plan. The entitlement to an appropriate
education is personal-each eligible child receives an individualized education
plan (IEP) and his educational instruction and related services should be
"specially designed ... to meet [his] unique needs .. .. "26 Thus, the concept of
FAPE is very flexible. An educational placement that might work for one child
with a learning disability might not work for another, depending upon the child's
abilities, needs, and progress. The IEP must be updated each year and is
developed by a team of people, including the child's teachers, the parent, a school
district representative, and, whenever "appropriate," the child herself.27 The
IDEIA also requires that children with disabilities be educated with their
non-disabled peers in the Least Restrictive Environment (LRE) possible.2 8 Thus,
a child should be mainstreamed as much as possible in a classroom or school with
typically developing children.
Since parental involvement is seen as the primary mechanism for protecting
children's educational entitlement, most of the expressly enumerated procedural
rights, such as notice of a proposed change in educational placement, accrue
primarily to the parents.29 School districts are responsible for encouraging or
21. See Cynthia Godsoe, Caught Between Two Systems: How Exceptional Children in Out-of-Home Care
Are Denied Equality in Education, 19 YALE L. & Pot'Y REv. 81, 84-85 (2000). Recent amendments to federal
regulations further strengthen parental rights over special education by allowing parents to refuse consent for
services for their children under certain situations. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.300(b)(4) (2008).
22. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A) (2006) (defining a child as "between ages of 3 and 21").
23. Id. §§ 1400(d)(1)(A)-(B).
24. See id. § 1415(a).
25. See id. §§ 1401(3)(A)(i)-(ii) (defining a child with a disability as a child "with mental retardation,
hearing impairments (including deafness), speech or language impairments, visual impairments (including
blindness), serious emotional disturbance (referred to in this chapter as 'emotional disturbance'), orthopedic
impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, or specific learning disabilities; and ...
[who] needs special education and related services").
26. Id. § 1401(29); see also id..§ 1401(26)(A) (explaining that "'related services' means transportation, and
such developmental, corrective, and other supportive services ... as may be required to assist a child. . .
27. Id. § 1414(a)(2)(B)(ii), (d)(1)(B)(i)-(vii).
28. Id. § 1412(a)(5).
29. Id. § 1415(b)(3). Other procedural protections include the right to: (1) participate in meetings about the
child's educational placement and examine records, 34 C.F.R. § 300.501 (2010); (2) object to evaluations,
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mandating parental participation in numerous ways, and interference with a
parent's participation rises to the level of a substantive violation.30 The statute
does not anticipate any conflict between parents and children, but it does require
appointment of a surrogate parent to protect the child's rights in extreme events
of parental failure, such as where the state is unable to locate a child's parents or
where the child is a ward of the state.'
Special education is a massive public program-having a total budget of
approximately 25.4 billion dollars and serving 6.6 million children.3 2 Although
most children receive services at local public schools, some children with more
severe needs are educated in private schools at public expense. A high proportion
of special education litigation centers on these private school placements,
probably because these schools are very expensive, with annual tuition ranging
from $39,000 to $80,000 for day schools and $125,000 to over $200,000 for
residential schools.3 4
Most IDEIA matters are resolved informally by the family and the school at the
school level. When the process does break down, however, any party can request
a due process hearing. The hearing may be appealed to federal court.3 6 There is
a growing bar of attorneys practicing in this field-one professional association
has thousands of members. Although most attorneys get involved at the hearing
or court stage, the high financial stakes at issue mean that an increasing number
of families retain attorneys to participate in the IEP development process and
informal pre-hearing advocacy.38
recommendations, and placements, 20 U.S.C § 1415(f)(1)(A); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.507, 300.512; and (3) be
awarded attorney's fees as a prevailing party (defined on the plaintiff's side not as the child but as the parent of a
child with a disability), 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B).
30. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii)(II). They must, for instance, ensure that: (1) parents' concerns for
enhancing the education of their child are considered by the IEP team, id. § 1414(d)(3)(A)(ii); (2) parents have
an opportunity to examine all pertinent records, id. § 1415(b)(1); and (3) parents unable to attend IEP meetings
can participate via telephone conference calls, 34 C.F.R. § 300.322.
31. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(6); 34 C.F.R. § 300.519.
32. See Digest ofEducation Statistics: 2009, NAr'LCTR. FOR EDUC. STAr., http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/
d09 (population served for 2007-08); Individuals with Disabilities Education Act-Funding Distribution, FED.
EDuc. BUDGETPROJEcr, http://febp.newamerica.net/background-analysis/individuals-disabilities-education-act-
funding-distribution (budget figures for fiscal year 2008).
33. For instance, the last two IDEIA cases decided by the Supreme Court, Winkelman and Forest Grove
School District, involved the parent's attempt to gain reimbursement for a child's private school placement. See
Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 129 S. Ct. 2484 (2009); Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516
(2007).
34. Matt Carroll, Low Pay an Issue at Special-Ed Schools, BOSToN GLOBE, Sept. 10, 2006, http://
www.boston.con/news/education/k_l2/articles/2006/09/10/low-pay.anjissue-at-special-ed-schools/.
35. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6).
36. Id. § 1415(i)(2).
37. See COUNcIL OF PARENT ArnoRNEYs AND ADvocATEs, 2009-2010 ANNUAL REPORT (2010), available at
www.copaa.org/pdf/2009-2010%20annual%20report4-12-10.pdf (COPAA has 1200 members).
38. For instance, numerous parents who seek reimbursement for private school placements for their children
retain an education attorney to submit their reimbursement request each year and deal with any administrative
hearings, even though the case will likely never go to court. Recognizing the importance of the right educational
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2. INTERTWINED PARENT AND CHILD RIGHTS UNDER WINKELMAN V PARMA
Until recently, a parent was seen primarily as a vehicle to act on her child's
behalf and secure the child an appropriate education, rather than as a real party in
interest under the statute. 39 Accordingly, most courts held that parents did not
have independent substantive rights under the IDEIA, but rather had only
procedural rights to enforce their children's entitlement to a FAPE.4 0 However, in
2007, the Supreme Court in Winkelman v. Parma held that a parent has
"independent enforceable rights . .. encompass[ing] the entitlement to a free
appropriate public education for [his] child."4 1 The Court thus held that the
Winkelmans could proceed pro se in federal court to pursue their own right to
appropriate educational placement for their son, Jacob, who has autism spectrum
disorder.4 2
In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied both on a plain reading of the
statutory language-including a statement of purpose ensuring that "the rights of
placement to a child's other legal interests, some public interest attorneys representing children in other matters,
such as delinquency cases, also engage in informal IDEIA advocacy on behalf of their clients.
39. Attorneys disagree about whether children have standing to independently pursue their claims under the
statute; some believe that children can pursue claims only through their parents. Compare Tandy & Heffernan,
supra note 12, at 1396-97 ("[Alttorneys can effectively provide legal representation to the child as the client,
rather than the parent, in IDEA cases .. .. "), with SUPERIOR COURT OF THE DIsT. OF COLUMBIA FAMILY COURT,
ATTORNEY PRACTICE STANDARDS FOR SPECIAL EDUCATION PANEL ATTORNEYS (2003), available at http://
www.dccourts.gov/decourts/docs/09-03Attachment.pdf [hereinafter D.C. PRACrlCE STANDARDS] (stating that
"the right to make educational decisions on behalf of a child are rights of the parent, and thus the parent is the
client of the Special Education Attorney" but conceding that attorneys can represent children and parents
together if there is no conflict). However, courts have repeatedly articulated children's independent need for
legal counsel/GAL under the IDEIA, thus clarifying that eitper the child or his parents have a claim in the case.
See, e.g., Muse' B. ex rel. Hanna B. v. Upper Darby Sch. Dist., No. 06-CV-00343, 2007 WL 2973709, at *I n.1
(E.D. Pa. Feb. 14, 2007), aff'd 282 F App'x 986 (3d Cir. 2008); see also Wenger v. Canastota Cent. Sch. Dist.,
146 F.3d 123, 125 (2d Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds by Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S.
516 (2007) (holding that a child was an interested party with a claim to bring).
40. See, e.g., Mosely v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi., 434 F.3d 527 (7th Cir. 2006); Collinsgru v. Palmyra Bd. of
Educ., 161 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 1998). But see Maroni v. Pemi-Baker Reg'I Sch. Dist., 346 F.3d 247 (1st Cir. 2003).
41. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516,533 (2007) (abrogating Cavanaugh v. Cardinal Local
Sch. Dist., 409 F.3d 753 (6th Cir. 2005)). The Court reversed the Sixth Circuit, which had prohibited the
Winkelmans from proceeding pro se, alleging a lack of FAPE for their child. The Circuit Court reasoned that the
parents could not proceed pro se, as they were litigating FAPE only on their son's behalf, and were barred from
proceeding pro se on behalf of their son by the longstanding common law rule against representing another
person pro se. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 150 F. App'x 406, 406-07 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Cavanaugh
v. Cardinal Local Sch. Dist., 409 F.3d 753, 757 (6th Cir. 2005)). The Supreme Court reversed and held that
parents have an independent enforceable right to FAPE, and thus the Winkelmans could proceed pro se on their
own behalf. Winkelman, 550 U.S. at 535. The dissent by Justice Scalia (joined by Justice Thomas) posits the
traditional vision of the IDEIA, wherein the parents can pursue pro se claims of violations of their own due
process rights, but not when they pursue claims of an inappropriate FAPE because they have no independent
right to FAPE. Id. at 535-36 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
42. Although it is arguable that Winkelman was wrongly decided, that discussion is beyond the scope of this
Article. Instead, my aim here is to address what representational model best fits the current state of education
doctrine, which includes the Court's decision that both parents and children have substantive rights under the
IDEIA.
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children with disabilities and parents of such children are protected"43-and on
the historical fundamental right of parents to raise their children as they see fit."
This holding reflects a conventional view of the family, wherein the parents
always have their child's best interests at heart: "Without question a parent of a
child with a disability has a particular and personal interest" in ensuring the
appropriate education of his child so that the child can become an independent
and fulfilled adult.45 The Court articulated the view that parents have long held
these same rights over their children's education, stating that it was not granting a
new "distinct class of people" independent rights under the IDEIA, but rather was
merely imposing the same requirements on the states to which they had always
been subject.46 Thus, the rights of parents and children have always been and
remain "intertwined."47 The Court declined to recognize any potential conflict
between parents and children and did not address whether a parent can proceed
pro se on behalf of her child, leaving ambiguous the degree to which the two are
independent parties for purposes of representation.48 Justice Scalia's dissent
criticized this view of "communal 'family' rights."49
Winkelman can be read either as strengthening the alignment of parent-child
interests or as clarifying a child's independent rights, and courts have interpreted
it both ways. In one sense, the presumption of parental control over her child is
even stronger-now the parent has claims of her own, not only on the-child's
behalf. Following this view, some courts have stated that the parent's case
encompasses the child's as their claims are "identical," "intertwined," or
"coterminous," 50 or even that parents alone can sue on their child's and their own
behalf.51 Thus, their interests are assumed to be aligned until proven divergent. 5 2
43. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(B).
44. Winkelman, 550 U.S. at 528-29 (citing Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) and Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)).
45. Id. at 529.
46. Id. at 534.
47. Id. at 531-34.
48. See id. at 535. The decision has been criticized, however, for implicitly undermining the traditional rule
against one party proceeding pro se on another party's behalf. See Logan Steiner, Playing Lawyers: The
Implications ofEndowing Parents with Substantive Rights Under the IDEA in Winkelman v. Parma City School
District, 31 HARv. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 1169 (2008).
49. Winkelman, 550 U.S. at 541 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
50. See Blanchard v. Morton Sch. Dist., 260 F. App'x 992, 993 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding it not necessary to
determine whether the child was party to the action because the parents' claims for recovery were "identical" to
the child's); see also Alexandra R. ex rel. Burke v. Brookline Sch. Dist., No. 06-CV-215, 2007 WL 2669717, at
*1 (D.N.H. Sept. 6, 2007) (finding that "the rights and interests of parents and their children under the IDEIA are
coextensive" and thus allowing parents who had previously sued on behalf of their child to sue on their own
behalf with no counsel for the child).
51. See J.L. v. Ambridge Area Sch. Dist., No. 06-CV-1652, 2008 WL 2798306, at *9 (W.D. Pa. July 18,
2008); Russell v. Dep't of Educ., No. 03-00654, 2007 WL 2915616, at *3 (D. Haw. Oct. 2,2007). Several courts
have even expanded the Winkelman holding to allow parents to proceed on claims under the ADA and Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act. See, e.g., Blanchard v. Morton Sch. Dist., 509 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2007). But
see D.A. ex rel. K.A. v. Pleasantville Sch. Dist., No. 07-4341, 2008 WL 2684239, at *7 (D.N.J. June 30, 2008)
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In accordance with this presumption, few courts have questioned whether
children, as parties with real interests under the statute, should be represented by
separate counsel and have instead assumed that they were represented by parents
and/or parents' counsel.5 3
On the other hand, by highlighting parents' independent rights, the Winkelman
decision has also led some courts to clarify that children have claims independent
of their parents and require their own attorney to pursue those claims, thus calling
into question the presumption of aligned interests and representation of children's
claims by their parents.5 4 Under the IDEIA, therefore, children with disabilities
actually have more rights to direct their education than other children because
they are entitled to receive an appropriate education in the least restrictive
environment and to have decisions made for them only on the basis of their
abilities and needs under the IDEIA. As one court put it:
I am mindful of a parent's fundamental constitutional rights to make decisions
on the care ... and education of her child . . . .This case, however, does not
involve an infringement on such basic constitutional rights. Rather, it is a
statutory action under the IDEIA .... [The child's] mother retains her right to
make decisions on such basic questions as how [he] should be raised and the
type of schooling he should receive, e.g. religious, private, or public.
Thus a parent who could send a typically developing child to military school, or
dictate her high school courses, does not have the same freedom to direct the
education of a child with a disability due to the state's statutory mandate to
identify and serve these children under IDEIA.
Nonetheless, since a parent may proceed pro se but a child generally may
not,56 practically all education cases will be resolved by the parent's claims
unless the court appoints an attorney for the child or directs the parent to hire one.
And most still do not.57 For instance, one court stated that a child "may seek to
("This Court respectfully disagrees with the extension of Winkelman into the context of the ADA and
Rehabilitation Act.").
52. See, e.g., D.K. ex rel. Kumetz-Coleman v. Huntington Beach Union High Sch. Dist., 554 F.3d 780, 780
(9th Cir. 2009) (declining to decide whether a parent can represent his child pro se as the rights of parents and
child under the IDEIA are "coterminous" and such a ruling would be premature "[u]nless and until the rights or
interests of the parents diverge from those of the child").
53. But see Wenger v. Canastota Cent. Sch. Dist., 146 F.3d 123, 125 (stating that the district court should
have looked to appointing an attorney for the child in that case rather than focusing only on the parents' need for
an attorney because the child is an interested party with a claim to bring).
54. B.D.S. v. Southold Union Free Sch. Dist., No. CV-08-1319, 2009 WL 1875942, at *14 (E.D.N.Y. June
24, 2009).
55. Muse' B. ex rel. Hanna B. v. Upper Darby Sch. Dist., No. 06-CV-00343, 2007 WL 2973709, at *4 (E.D.
Pa. Feb. 14, 2007), aff'd 282 F. App'x 986 (3d Cir. 2008) (appointing separate counsel/GAL for the child).
56. FED. R. CIv. P. 17.
57. See, e.g., B.D.S., 2009 WL 1875942, at *14 (ordering plaintiff mother to obtain counsel or move for
appointment of counsel for the plaintiff child or the child's claims would be dismissed without prejudice).
There, the court stated that the mother could proceed with her own claims even if she did not obtain counsel for
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rejoin the action, should he obtain representation of an attorney in the future.""
Yet the court did not appoint counsel, so the pro se parent alone proceeded on her
claims. Similarly, another district court declined to consider the school district's
motion to appoint independent counsel/GAL for the child in an IDEIA action due
to a conflict with the mother because the mother was "plainly suing" to enforce
her own right to the child's FAPE, which was coextensive with the child's right.
The child was thus not a plaintiff in the case and the mother was not required to
obtain counsel for him.6 0 Accordingly, the court amended the caption to remove
the child. In neither case did the court appear to ascertain the child's views before
these rulings. Nor have the children subsequently brought claims on their own
behalf, and they are unlikely to do so with no access to counsel.
These practices render the separation of the child's and parent's claims largely
semantic-the parent's claims are the only ones to go forward, and thus the
child's case is disposed of via the parent's claims. They also demonstrate that,
post-Winkelman, most courts continue to assume that children's interests are
aligned with those of their parents in education cases without ascertaining the
children's views or ensuring that they are represented by counsel (either jointly or
individually). Thus, the presumption remains largely intact despite the Court's
recognition of a child's and parent's individual interests under the IDEIA.
B. ATTORNEY PRACTICE REFLECTING THE PRESUMPTION
Attorney perceptions and practice can influence whether an attorney-client
relationship is formed-and thus who the client is-increasing the risk of conflict
and/or rendering it unlikely that such a conflict will be uncovered.6 1 Neither a
parent nor a child has an entitlement to an attorney in an IDEIA case, but there is
a growing bar of attorneys working in this field.62 In this section, I will outline the
her child, and it is unclear whether the court would appoint counsel for the child sua sponte. Id.; see also Lenker
v. Gray, No. 2:07-0274, 2008 WL 4613534, at *5-6 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 10, 2008) (dismissing the child's claim but
then holding that its denial of the motion to appoint counsel for the mother and child together did not adversely
affect the child's claim since the mother was proceeding pro se on mother's claims).
58. L.J. ex rel. N.N.J. v. Broward Cty. Sch. Bd., No 06-61282, 2007 WL 1695333, at *2 (S.D. Fla. June 8,
2007); see also B.J.S. v. State Educ. Dep't/Univ. of NY, No. 08-CV-513A(F), 2010 WL 502796, at *1
(W.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2010) ("[Tlhe court must consider appointment of counsel for [the child] in the absence of
which the court would be required to dismiss [his] claims.").
59. B.J.S., 2010 WL502796, at *3.
60. Id. Interestingly, the attorney for the mother in that case has expressed an intent to file an amended
complaint, re-adding the child as a party, and will represent both mother and child in the action, because she
does not want to risk a non-final deal as the family approaches settlement with the school district. Telephone
Interview with Russell Engler, Attomey for the Sch. Dist. in B.J.S. (June 24, 2010).
61. Moore, supra note 12, at 1824-25.
62. See COUNCIL OF PARNT ATrORNEYS AND ADvocATEs, supra note 37. After Gault, children have a
constitutional right to attorney representation only in delinquency proceedings, but they are sometimes entitled
by federal or state statutes to representation either by attorneys or lay people (as a GAL/CASA) in other
proceedings, such as abuse and neglect, custody, and status offenses proceedings. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1
(1967); Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment and Adoption Reform, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5116 (2006). Thus
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usual attorney-client contexts in education cases and identify how the presump-
tion may shape these relationships to obscure children's voices and parent-child
conflicts, thereby putting attorneys at risk for violating ethical standards.
It is often difficult to discern the precise attorney-client relationship in
education cases, as there is considerable confusion among both families and
attorneys about who the attorney is actually representing."4 Because most cases
are initiated by a parent who privately retains counsel, the attorneys in these cases
generally represent parents. Nonetheless, other attorneys do represent children,
whether they are court-appointed, public interest attorneys at non-profits, or
private-sector attorneys paid for by parents. Numerous others represent both
children and parents, although, as outlined further below, duties to both parties
may arise without an explicit agreement for joint representation.
many members of the children's bar, who represent children in abuse and neglect, custody, and delinquency
cases, do not litigate IDEIA cases despite their recognition of the importance of education to these other
proceedings. This, however, will hopefully change as experts and children's advocates increasingly recognize
that effective representation for children in other proceedings entails knowing about and addressing a child's
educational needs. See, e.g., NATIONAL JUVENILE DEFENDER CENTER, PRINCIPLES IN PRACTICE: PROMOTING
ACCOUNTABILYTY, SAFETY AND FAIRNESS IN JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 5-6, available at http://
www.njdc.info/pdf/principles-in-practice.pdf (listing educational advocacy as one of ten core principles that
should guide juvenile defenders because so many of their clients have educational needs and the "[1]ack of
appropriate education and mental health services by schools and communities can be the underlying cause of the
crime"); ABA STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYERS REPRESENTING CHILDREN IN CUSTODY CASES Ill.F (2003)
[hereinafter ABA CUSTODY STANDARDS], available at http://www.abanet.org/family/reports/standardschild
cusody.pdf (stating that the attorney may need to address issues (including education issues), especially for a
child with a disability).
63. This section draws in part on my experience representing children in abuse/neglect, delinquency, and
special education cases and as a member of the Education and Juvenile Justice Bar Committees of the New York
City Bar Association.
64. At a recent presentation of this paper at the University of Oregon School of Law, a special education
practitioner told me that she and her colleagues were never quite sure whether they represented the parents or
the children or both. These comments echo my conversations with other education law attorneys. Identification
of the client is also a frequent problem in other types of cases involving the representation of family members.
See Moore, supra note 12, at 1824.
65. See, e.g., Ashland Sch. Dist. v. Parents of Student R.J., 585 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1211 n.1 (D. Or. 2008)
("[T]he attorney in an IDEIA action usually represents the parents-whose objectives are not always congruent
with the views articulated by the child."). A major organization of special education attorneys calls themselves
the Council of Parent Attorneys and Advocates (COPAA) (emphasis added). Attorneys may also be court-
appointed to represent parents.
66. In addition to many public sector attorney organizations, several private attorneys advertise themselves
as representing children and youth. See, e.g., Jennifer Laviano, CONN. SPECIAL EDUC. LAW., http://
www.connecticutspecialeducationlawyer.com (last visited Feb. 22, 2011). In these cases, the parent's role often
creates confusion-is the parent a mere liaison between the attorney and the child client, or does she direct the
case on her child's behalf? Commentators have pointed out similar confusion in client identity and the roles of
various parties in other cases involving family members, particularly elderly family members. See, e.g., Collett,
supra note 7, at 1461.
67. See, e.g., Muse' B. ex rel. Hanna B. v. Upper Darby Sch. Dist., No. 06-CV-00343, 2007 WL 2973709, at
*1-3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 14, 2007), aff'd 282 F. App'x 986 (3d Cir. 2008) (describing how several sets of attorneys
had represented both the child and his mother pro bono); D.C. PRACTICE STANDARDS, supra note 39; see also
GREY & GREY, http://www.greyslaw.com/website/html/home.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2011); CONNOLLY,
JACOBSON & JOHN, http://www.cjjedlaw.com (last visited Feb. 22, 2011).
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1. ATrORNEYS REPRESENTING PARENTS
Many attorneys representing parents, and paid by parents, interpret parents'
rights to direct a child's education to mean that they should not consult with even
older children about their education placement.6 8 Some of them are also not well
versed in other legal issues related to children; for instance, they are unfamiliar
with practice standards for the representation of children that recommend
consulting with even non-client children. 6 9 As a result, these attorneys do not
interview or regularly meet with children.70
This results both in a failure to gain valuable information about the case and,
often, worse outcomes-children who are not consulted about their educational
placement will be less likely to succeed in it.7 I Attorneys who do not regularly
meet with the children involved will also be far less likely to uncover important
differences in the parties' interests. Moreover, although these attorneys only
represent parents, they likely have ethical obligations even to non-client
children-the Model Rules and practice standards for children and adults in
family law cases posit a potential or actual duty to prevent or correct action
adverse to the interests of non-client minors. 7 2 Accordingly, attorneys should not
just blindly follow the presumption that the child's and parent's interests are
aligned. Rather, they should attempt to uncover significant differences in interests
between parents and child, while meeting their duties to their parent clients and
seeking appointment of independent counsel for the child if necessary.
2. ArroRNEYs REPRESENTING CHLDREN
There is a relatively small group of attorneys solely representing children in
these matters. They usually do so as court-appointed GAL/counsel, often in
conjunction with another case, such as an abuse/neglect or delinquency case.
68. Henning, supra note 9, at 294 (noting that some attorneys representing children in delinquency cases
may allow parents to direct the case due to a similar philosophy). This is not to say that public interest education
attorneys representing children or families do not also have conflicting interests. They may be motivated by
different factors that impinge upon best communicating with clients and identifying conflicts, such as larger
ideological goals that are at odds with their actual clients' real interests. See Moore, supra note 12, at 1843.
69. See, e.g., D.C. PRACTICE STANDARDS, supra note 39, at D-1 (mandating that a lawyer for a parent in a
special education case "consult with all relevant parties, including the child and/or the child's representative").
70. My own practice experience and reports from parents and practitioners indicate that many private sector
IDEIA attorneys do not regularly meet with the children involved. This is so even where the special needs
children are verbal. Of course, some parents' attorneys do regularly meet with children, and some agencies
representing parents will not do so unless there is an alignment of the parent and child's interests. I seek here
only to outline some trends among some of the bar that impact families in education cases.
71. See infra note 259 and accompanying text.
72. See infra note 187 and accompanying text.
73. Children's advocates, however, have called for more children's attorneys to represent children in special
education proceedings, whether independently or ancillary to other proceedings. Recommendations of the
UNLV Conference on Representing Children in Families: Child Advocacy and Justice Ten Years After Fordham,
6 NEV. L.J. 592, 597 (2006) [hereinafter UNLVRecommendations].
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An even smaller number are paid by parents but see themselves as representing
children. Many children's attorneys, of course, adequately represent the child's
interests.74 The presumption, however, does lead some of these lawyers to ignore
the child's views and to accord parents a greater role in the attorney-client
relationship than permitted under the Model Rules. Professor Kristin Henning has
termed this "parent-directed advocacy."75 For instance, an attorney may reveal
confidential information about the case to a parent or allow her to direct the
representation. This may sometimes be the result of conflicting guidance about
an attorney's duties. For instance, the court in Muse' B. ex rel. Hanna B. v.
Upper Darby School District directed the child's "guardian attorney"-
appointed after the court found a conflict between the mother and the child which
harmed the child's interests-to keep the mother informed and consult with her
as to every aspect of the case, although this could violate the duty of
confidentiality to the child client.7
74. If the child is represented and the parent proceeds pro se, attorneys should proceed with caution. The
unrepresented party may not understand the attorney's role and, in the case of a parent, is likely to rely on the
attorney for advice or believe the attorney is representing the parent's interests. See Cahn & Tuttle, supra note 6,
at 101 n.13 (pointing out this danger). There is also a risk that some children's attorneys, particularly in the
abuse/neglect context, will not adequately consider the parent's views, instead assuming that once a conflict has
arisen in one arena, the parent is not capable of acting in the child's interests in any capacity. This view not only
disregards the parent's rights in the education sphere but also may harm the child's need or desire for input from
one of the most important people in her life.
75. See Henning, supra note 9, at 294-303 (noting this practice and its potential harms in the delinquency
context); see also Moore, supra note 12, at 1844-48 (pointing this out as a risk in all cases wherein children have
claims). The risk of a conflict is increased when a parent pays for her child's attorney, as the parent may feel
more entitled to direct the representation and the attorney feels pressure that if she disagrees with the parent, she
may be fired. See Tandy & Heffernan, supra note 12, at 1402-03. Even pro bono counsel for the child or family
may be subject to the whims of the parent. See Muse' B. ex rel. Hanna B. v. Upper Darby Sch. Dist., No.
06-CV-00343, 2007 WL 2973709, at *1-3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 14, 2007), aff'd 282 F. App'x 986 (3d Cir. 2008)
(noting that the mother had discharged two pro bono attorneys appointed to represent her and her son).
76. Even where the attorney does not believe that a parent has a right to direct his child's representation, the
child himself may believe so and/or want the parent to do so. For a discussion of the ethical obligations of the
child's attorney when the child wants to defer to her parents, see William A. Kell, Ties That Bind? Children's
Attorneys, Children's Agency and the Dilemma of Parental Affiliation, 29 Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 353 (1998)
(concluding that attorneys should respect children's agency where the child is deciding to defer to her parents or
act out of affiliation with them, if the attorney ascertains that the child is not impaired nor is being coerced by
her parent).
77. Courts' conception of the role of appointed GAL/counsel for children in IDEIA and other cases further
compounds the confusion about the role of an attorney for a child. Although the Model Rules and practice
standards appear to posit the GAL and lawyer/advocate as two separate roles, in practice, children in education
cases are usually appointed a GAL/counsel serving a hybrid role. See infra notes 171-202 and accompanying
text; see also, e.g., Muse'B., 2007 WL 2973709, at *1-3 (identifying a conflict with the mother and appointing
an "attorney guardian" for the child "to represent [the child's] interests" and also litigate "three potential issues
concerning the implementation of the consent decree" for the child); Springfield Sch. Comm. v. Doe, 623 F.
Supp. 2d 150, 154 (D. Mass. 2009) (appointing attorney to act both as child's surrogate parent and as his
attorney for IDEIA claims). Experts and some courts have repeatedly noted the inherent conflict in one attorney
playing both of these roles. See infra note 194.
78. Muse'B., 2007 WL 2973709, at *4-5. Parents are not granted an exception to confidentiality between an
attorney and a child client. See, e.g., N.C. State Bar, 98 Formal Op. 18 (1999).
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The presumption may be so strong that the lawyer does not consult with her
own client, the child, assuming instead that only the parents can inform her about
the case. 7 9 For instance, in one of the rare cases where a court did recognize a
conflict between the mother and child in an IDEIA case and appointed the child a
separate GAL/counsel, the attorney apparently did not interview her third-grade
child client, although she "had numerous discussions with" the mother and other
parties about the case.80 Thus, the attorney not only failed to recognize and
appropriately deal with an already identified conflict, she was at risk of
committing malpractice.
3. ATTORNEYS REPRESENTING BOTH PARENTS AND CHILDREN
A lawyer may end up representing both a parent and child without her or the
parties explicitly engaging in joint representation-because of the presumption,
many attorneys who represent parents believe that they are also implicitly
attorneys for the child.8 1 Accordingly, many special education attorneys who are
initially retained to represent parents purport to be "child advocates" and
advertise themselves as advocates for children and youth with disabilities.8 2 They
may have children co-sign retainers and/or tell the children themselves they are
the children's attorneys or are working for them.8 3 (Similarly, some attorneys
purporting to represent students characterize themselves as advocates for the
79. Patricia M. Batt, The Family Unit As Client: A Means to Address the Ethical Dilemmas Confronting
Elder Law Attorneys, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 319, 323 (1992) (noting the same dynamic of relying on other
family members for information in the representation of elder clients).
80. Supplementary Brief of Appellant at 5-6, Muse' B. ex rel. Hanna B. v. Upper Darby Sch. Dist., 293 F.
App'x 133 (3d Cir. 2008) (No. 07-4111), 2008 WL 4005082, at *5-6 (outlining in detail the actions of the GAL
for the child, totaling sixty hours, and including discussions with the mother and the child's teachers, an
observation of the child in class, and consultations with the three sets of attorneys who had previously
represented the child and his mother).
81. In a special education study, one parents' attorney characterized himself and his fellow parents' attorneys
"as advocates for the child." EDWARD FEINBERG & JONATHAN BEYER, THE ROLE OF ATTORNEYS IN SPECIAL
EDUCATION MEDIATION, A BRIEFING PAPER FOR THE CONsORTUM FOR APPROPRIATE DIsPuTE RESOLUTION IN
SPECIAL EDUCATION (2000), available at www.directionservice.org/cadre/pdf/The%20Role%20of%20
Attorneys%20in%2OSpecial%2OEducation%20Mediation.pdf
82. One non-profit primarily represents parents in education cases (albeit only when there is no conflict of
interest between parent and child), but is called Advocates for Children (emphasis added). As a result, many
young people believe, reasonably, that the organization represents them. In 1998, a special education advocacy
organization representing parents, Legal Services for Children, changed its name to Partnership for Children to
remedy exactly this confusion.
83. For instance, an attorney or parent may say to the child: "I'm here to help you get the best school." This
can give the false impression that the attorney's main role is to advocate for the child's wishes. Instead, the
attorney could say something like: "I'm here to help your parents get the best school to meet your needs. We are
all going to work together, but if you and your parent disagree about what educational placement is best for you,
I will be working for your parent to try to get what she thinks is best for you."
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entire family.8") This leads to confusion among the parties as both the parent and
child may reasonably believe that they are the clients, possibly giving rise to
duties by the attorney to both parties or even joint representation . Even courts
appointing pro bono counsel may appoint one attorney for both parent and child,
without ensuring that the standards for joint representation are met.8 6
Because of the presumption, many of these attorneys will not anticipate
divergent legal interests between a parent and child. That is, their belief that
parents always act in their children's interests can blind them to potential
conflicts. Compounding this dynamic is the inevitable analysis of the division
of power and rights between parent and child that accompanies any determina-
tion of a conflict between them. For instance, an attorney who believes that
parents are entitled to decide their child's school placement, including sending
him to a restrictive residential school, and, moreover, believes that the child's
opposition to the school is merely adolescent stubbornness, is less likely to
identify a conflict or recognize that such a conflict could impair the representa-
tion. This is compounded by the fact that some of these attorneys, as in the
contexts discussed above, do not meet with the children. Finally, the attorney's
desire to maintain family harmony may also make her loathe to dredge up
conflicts.
These practices both obscure the child's voice and potential conflicts and, in
84. See, e.g., ABA, CAREER PATHS IN CHILD ADVOCACY 11, available at http://new.abanet.org/child/
PublicDocuments/pathprofile.pdf (attorney notes the challenge of "working with a family unit instead of only
one client").
85. Client expectations and perceptions may give rise to duties to a third party non-client and can influence
who the actual client(s) are. See Moore, supra note 12, at 1824-25, 1843; State Bar of Mich. Standing Comm. on
Prof'l and Judicial Ethics, Op. RI-140 (1992) (ruling that the child was the client in a medical malpractice case
for harm to the child, even though the mother retained and directed the attorney, and the attorney thought the
mother was his client); BARBARA GLESNER FINES, ETHICAL ISSUES IN FAMILY REPRESENTATION 85 (2010)
(discussing attorney duties of confidentiality to people who would not ordinarily be considered clients based
upon the circumstances of the communication).
86. See, e.g., Montclair Bd. of Educ. v. M.W.D., No. 05-3516, 2007 WL 1852342, at *2 (D.N.J. June 26,
2007) (allowing the mother to submit application for pro bono counsel "on behalf of herself and her son").
87. Some commentators go even further and argue that the presumption entitles parents to direct the
representation of the child in most situations, thus making a parent-child conflict basically impossible.
88. See Moore, supra note 12, at 1856 (noting that questions of conflicts in the representation of children are
integrally tied to issues of the parents' and children's substantive rights, including the rights of parents to direct
their children's representation); see also Janet L. Dolgin, The Morality of Choice: Estate Planning and the
Client Who Chooses Not to Choose, 22 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 31, 34 (1998) (noting that the decision about whether
to jointly represent spouses implicitly reflects the law's view of their relationship and what constitutes a family).
A theory of a child's interest also may influence who one believes is an appropriate representative for a child.
Rachel F. Moran, Reflections on the Enigma of Indeterminacy in Child-Advocacy Cases in the Interest of
Children: Advocacy, Law Reform, and Public Policy, 74 CAL. L. REv. 603, 615 (1986) (discussing Professor
Mnookin's "paradox of child advocacy"). Thus, if a lawyer believes that parents have strong rights to direct their
children's education, she will believe that a parent is a sufficient and appropriate representative of the child's
interests in almost all cases.
89. David H. Neely, Handicapped Advocacy: Inherent Barriers and Partial Solutions in the Representation
of Disabled Children, 33 HASTINGs L.J. 1359, 1964 n.20 (1982) (noting that this impulse against identifying
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some cases, put the attorney at risk for ethical violations. Coupled with the failure
of many courts to ascertain the child's views or appoint counsel (either
independently or jointly) for children, the assumed congruence of parent and
child interests becomes circular-because the parent speaks for the child and her
position is based upon the child's perceived interests, frequently no one obtains a
position or independent information from the child. 90 Thus, it is rarely revealed if
the parent's. and child's interests are in fact aligned.
II. TIE PRESUMPTION BREAKS DOWN: CONFLICT BETWEEN PARENTS
AND CHILDREN
In this Part, I further outline this central problem with the pervasiveness of the
presumption-that it obscures the child's voice and concomitantly any risk of
conflict between parents and children. 91 Courts rarely appoint separate counsel
for children unless a conflict is uncovered, even where they acknowledge the
parties' separate claims.9 2 In recent decades, however, courts and ethics
committees have recognized the high risk of conflict between parents and
children in several areas such as abuse/neglect and custody cases and barred dual
representation in those cases. Nonetheless, conflicts still go virtually unrecog-
nized in the educational context-the presumption remains unquestioned. This is
so although some parental actions, such as seeking placement in a residential
school for noneducational reasons, are similarly restrictive to the mental health
commitment of children where the parent is a movant-a situation flagged as a
per se conflict in practice standards for children's attorneys.
A. RECOGNITION OF PARENT-CHILD CONFLICT IN OTHER AREAS
The general assumption that parents act in their children's best interests has
given way to a recognition of the risk of parent-child conflict in several limited
conflict between parents and children "may be particularly strong when the legal problem has arisen outside the
family, and both parent and child seem united against a common enemy").
90. Professor Catherine Ross has pointed out an analogous problem in the custody context where conflicts
between parents and children would not be uncovered if children were not represented by counsel nor their
views solicited in custody cases. See Catherine J. Ross, From Vulnerability to Voice: Appointing Counsel for
Children in Civil Litigation, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1571, 1583-84 (1996).
91. A similar presumption of aligned interests among married couples or other family members often
obscures conflict in those areas as well. See, e.g., Alysa Christmas Rollock, Professional Responsibility and
Organization of the Family Business: The Lawyer as Intermediary, 73 IND. L.J. 567, 572 (1998).
92. Even where children are entitled to counsel against the state in delinquency proceedings in which the
parent is not even a party, see In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967), some commentators argue that a parent can
direct his child's delinquency attorney because "the child's right to an attorney is possessed by the family
collectively and not the child individually." Jonathan 0. Hafen, Children's Rights and Legal Representation-
The Proper Roles of Children, Parents, and Attorneys, 7 NOTRE DAME J.L. Enics & PuB. POt'Y 423, 447 n.102
(1993).
93. See, e.g., Fordham Recommendations, supra note 11, at 1318. Nonetheless, courts have overlooked
conflicts in mental health commitment proceedings as well. See Ross, supra note 90, at 1581-83.
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areas. The most obvious example is where a parent has been accused of abusing
or neglecting her child. In such cases, the ethical guidelines recognize that a
parent and child cannot be represented by the same attorney because the risk that
their interests are not aligned is too great.9 4 Courts and scholars have also noted
the potential divergence between parents' and children's interests in custody and
delinquency cases. In the delinquency context, for instance, there is a risk that a
parent may want her child placed out of the home for reasons not in the child's
interests. Courts, bar ethics committees, and scholars have also recognized
conflicts between parents and children in a range of cases, including insurance,
trusts," and medical malpractice.99
A more general recognition of the potential for conflict between parents and
children is the common law rule that a parent may not represent her child pro
se.1" This rule is based on multiple rationales, including the fact that some
parents are ill-informed about how best to represent their children's interests,
thereby compromising children's claims, and that minors should have some
choice in who represents their interests-having a parent represent their legal
interests, rather than an attorney, may not reflect a real choice.1 o' Other parties
with similar or aligned interests are not permitted to litigate each other's claims,
so parents should not be allowed to do so for their children. As the Second Circuit
put it: "There is nothing in the guardian-minor relationship that suggests that the
minor's interests would be furthered by representation by the non-attorney
guardian." 0 2 This rule has been applied in numerous IDEIA cases both before
and after Winkelman,10 3 and appears to contradict the general presumption that
94. Professor Martin Guggenheim argues, however, that children should not have independent lawyers until
the presumption that parents are fit is overcome. Guggenheim, supra note 8, at 811-12.
95. See, e.g., Fordham Recommendations, supra note 11, at 1318-19.
96. Henning, supra note 8, at 858.
97. See generally Mot. to Appoint Guardian Ad Litem for Defendant Minors, Nationwide Life Ins. Co. v. Von
Hohn, No. 609CV00087, 2009 WL 2411107 (W.D. Tex. June 12, 2009) (appointing GAL where mother sought
to be sole beneficiary of a life insurance policy of her deceased husband and conflict existed between her and her
two children, who were also potential beneficiaries); Mot. for Appointment of Guardian Ad Litem, Tilley v.
Barrs, No. 508CV00434, 2009 WL 1418041 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 3, 2009).
98. See generally Joint Mot. for Appointment of Guardian Ad Litem, Raoul v. Whitaker, No. 4-08-CV-139,
2009 WL 1946423 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 6, 2009).
99. See generally State Bar of Mich. Standing Comm. on Prof'l and Judicial Ethics, Op. RI-140 (1992).
100. See, e.g., Cheung v. Youth Orchestra Found., 906 F.2d 59, 61 (2d Cir. 1990). The same desire to protect
the child's legal interests prohibits parents from waiving a child's right to counsel. Moore, supra note 12, at
1831.
101. See Steiner, supra note 48, at 1176-80; see also Devine v. Indian River Cnty. Sch. Bd., 121 F.3d 576,
582 (11th Cir. 1997) (stating that the rule exists "because it helps to ensure that children rightfully entitled to
legal relief are not deprived of their day in court by unskilled, if caring, parents"); Elustra v. Mineo, 595 F.3d
699, 706 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting that the rule is to protect the represented party against, inter alia, a waiver of his
rights by the representative and that this rationale is particularly strong in the case of minors who cannot appear
in court themselves).
102. Cheung, 906 F.2d at 61.
103. See, e.g., Tindall v. Poultney High Sch. Dist., 414 F.3d 281 (2d Cir. 2005).
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parents are the best voice for their children and that they can consequently direct
litigation on behalf of the child.
B. RISK OF CONFLICT IN EDUCATION CASES
Although lower than in abuse/neglect or custody cases, there is a risk of
conflict between the interests of parents and children in education cases. In fact,
the risk in education cases is higher than in numerous other civil litigation
contexts, because a free appropriate public education is a nuanced and
individualized concept, which can change dramatically over the course of a
child's education. Moreover, education impacts a child's life in a fashion that
money damages and other financial benefits do not.1 " The presumption that
parents act in their children's interests and the widespread practice of attorneys
and courts not to ascertain the child's views, however, obscure many of these
situations; as a result, few courts or hearing officers have addressed these
issues. 1o05
Even when noting obstructionist action on the part of a parent, courts and
hearing officers often decline to appoint counsel or a GAL for the child. 106 Yet an
analysis of IDEIA case law reveals several situations where there is a conflict
between the parents and children, even if the court does not expressly label it as
such. The risk of conflict arises in three main areas: where a parent acts against a
child's legal interests; where the parent and child disagree over educational
services and placements; or where a parent is unwilling to adequately advocate
for her child's education under the IDEIA, as she has been entrusted to do under
the statutory scheme. 10 7 All of these situations are conflicts under the Model
104. Conflicts over education issues also become more common as children mature. Barbara Bennett
Woodhouse, Speaking Truth to Power: Challenging "The Power of Parents to Control the Education of Their
Own", 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. Pot'Y 481, 499 (2002).
105. For instance, although a few IDEIA opinions indicate that a GAL/counsel will be appointed to represent
a child, or mention a motion therefore, no such motions are published. See, e.g., B.J.S. v. State Educ.
Dep't/Univ. of State of N.Y., No. 08-CV-513A(F), 2010 WL 502796, at * I (W.D.N.Y Feb. 9, 2010). One state,
New York, however, appears to anticipate some conflicts as it enacted legislation specifically mandating the
appointment of a GAL in an administrative hearing under the IDEIA where the interests of the parents and
students diverge or the child's interests would be best served by a GAL appointment. N.Y Comp. Codes R. &
Regs. tit. 8, § 200.5(j)(3)(ix) (2008). As with attorneys/GALs appointed for minors in federal court (see supra
note 77), the GAL's role is somewhat unclear-she is to "represent the interests" of the child, but may be either a
pro bono attorney or a lay person who is qualified to serve as a "surrogate parent." N.Y. Comp. Codes R. &
Regs. tit. 8, § 200.1(s).
106. See, e.g., Ashland Sch. Dist. v. Parents of Student R.J., 585 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1211-12, 1224 (D. Or.
2008); Application of a Child with a Disability, Appeal No. 96-43 (N.Y State Educ. Dep't Sept. 27, 1996),
available at http://www.sro.nysed.gov/decisionindex/1996/96-43.htm (declining to appoint a GAL for the child,
despite the mother's repeated attempts to delay the hearing, and affirming the mother's "abandonment" of the
action, thus leaving the child with no educational placement).
107. I am indebted to my colleague Professor Marsha Garrison for pointing out that conflicts tend to be
noticed, if at all, when a parent seeks a more restrictive placement than is in the child's interests, because such
placements are expensive and the school district often objects. Because a parent now has the right to completely
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Rules; the same attorney cannot represent two clients with conflicting legal
interests or different stated goals, or where one client (the parent) is obstructing
the ability of the other client (the child) to receive the educational placement to
which he is entitled.
1. PARENT Acrs AGAINST A CHILD'S LEGAL INTERESTS
A parent who takes a position in her child's education case for reasons other
than the child's educational benefit is clearly not acting to enforce the child's
legal interests. There may be a variety of financial and personal factors
motivating parents' actions, subsequently giving rise to a potential conflict
between the parent and child. 08 For instance, parents of one disabled child
refused to -allow their child to be physically examined, although this was a
necessary part of her evaluation for special education, because they feared that
such an examination would jeopardize their insurance case regarding an
automobile accident in which their daughter was injured. 109 This refusal, coupled
with the parents' placement of the child in a private school not approved to
educate children with disabilities, resulted in the child stagnating without
meaningful instruction for several years. 1 o These parental actions seemingly
against the child's interests led the state appellate hearing board for education
matters to order a determination of whether the child required appointment of a
GAL.'"
A parent's emotional issues, such as being overwhelmed by a child's needs and
behavior at home or feeling shameful or protective of the child's disability, may
also lead to a divergence in the interests of parents and children. 1 12 These
non-educational concerns sometimes cause parents to seek overly restrictive
educational settings, such as residential placements, which are directly contrary
decline IDEIA services for her child, see supra note 21, and school districts may not object to providing less
services than required, a conflict where a parent does not seek sufficient services for her child may go unnoticed.
108. Commentators have pointed out a similar conflict in delinquency cases where parents act as advisors to
their children or direct their legal case but have other motivations, such as having the children placed out of the
home because the parents do not approve of the child's behavior. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
Interestingly, some of the minors discussed in the cases infra were arrested and involved with the juvenile
justice system. See, e.g., W. Windsor-Plainsboro Reg'1 Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. J.S., No. Civ. 04-3459, 2005
WL 2897494, at *6, 9 (D.N.J. 2005); J.M. v. Kingsway Reg'l Sch. Dist., No. 04-4046, 2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis
18110, at *5-6 (D.N.J. 2005).




112. See, e.g., Application of a Child with a Disability, Appeal No. 01-099 (N.Y. State Educ. Dep't Apr. 24,
2002), available at http://www.sro.nysed.gov/decisionindex/2001/01-099.htm (affirming hearing officer's
appointment of a GAL for an autistic child because the mother had tried "to avoid participating in the process to
develop appropriate services for her son and to delay the proceedings" where her son was sexually acting out
and the mother was uncomfortable addressing his sexual behavior).
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to the child's right to be educated in the least restrictive environment." 3 For
instance, the mother of a mentally retarded daughter sought residential placement
under the IDEIA for her child largely in order to gain "relief for herself," and was
thus "essentially passive in matters pertaining to [her daughter's education], and
proactive only in seeking temporary or permanent placements for [her daughter]
out of the home."ll 4 Although the court found the mother's motivations
sympathetic, it concluded that such an overly restrictive placement was not in the
child's legal interests under the IDEIA." 5
The risk of conflict from a parent seeking an overly restrictive placement for
non-educational reasons is particularly high with older children who demonstrate
behavior problems at home. For instance, in Ashland School District v. Parents of
Student R.J., parents removed their teenaged daughter from a mainstream public
school to have her "escorted" to an extremely restrictive private "behavioral
modification facility" in another state.' 6 The decision was largely prompted. by
the minor's behaviors outside of the home, which included being defiant, acting
out in response to her parents' divorce, and having relationships with a possibly
abusive boyfriend and an older man, rather than academic problems." 7 The
child's educational progress declined dramatically at the facility and her behavior
worsened." 8 After being expelled from that facility, she was sent to a more
restrictive one operated by the same for-profit company. 1 9 The court found no
evidence that the child needed such a restrictive level of placement.' 20 The court
recognized that the parents had acted in their own, rather than their daughter's,
interest when it amended the caption to reflect that they were the real parties in
interest and noted that the parents' "objectives are not always congruent with the
views articulated by the child."'21 Similarly, in J.M. v. Kingsway Regional School
District, a mother sought residential placement for her son, a sixteen-year-old
diagnosed with ADHD, only after he was arrested for stealing her car and going
113. Of course, there are many cases where parents advocate for a residential placement based on
educational reasons and a belief that it is the most appropriate placement for their child.
114. D.B. v. Ocean Twp. Bd. of Educ., 985 F. Supp. 457, 527-28 (D.N.J. 1997). As with all services under the
IDEIA, residential placement, if deemed the appropriate educational setting for the child, would be at no cost to
the parent since the child is guaranteed afree appropriate public education.
115. Id. at 528. The court did not explicitly find a conflict between the mother and child, perhaps due to the
presumption, but did decline to place the child in a residential institution. Id.
116. Ashland Sch. Dist. v. Parents of Student R.J., 585 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1211-12, 1224 (D. Or. 2008)
(residents are limited to one phone call a week, monitored by staff, and family visits are infrequent). The mother
also sought to have her daughter's disability classification changed from other health impairment (ADHD) to
emotionally impaired so that she could qualify for the very restrictive residential school. Id. at 1217. The facility
is part of a national chain of for-profit facilities for minors who have "demonstrated oppositional behavior." Id.
at 1224.
117. Id. at 1220-21, 1224, 1230-32.
118. Id. at 1224-25.
119. Id. at 1225.
120. Id. at 1225-26, 1231.
121. Id. at 1211 n.1, 1231.
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on a high-speed chase. 12 2 Residential placement was a much more restrictive
placement than his current setting, where he was mainstreamed with some
in-class support, and the school district believed that the evaluations the mother
relied on to advocate for residential placement addressed only in-home behav-
iors. The mother refused to allow additional evaluations of her son and, feeling
"physically threatened" by her son, unilaterally placed him in a private boarding
school in Utah and sought reimbursement from the school district.123 Nonethe-
less, the mother and her son were represented by the same attorney in the
matter. 124
Thousands of children with disabilities are placed in these facilities pursuant to
the IDEIA.12 5 Yet there is significant evidence that children. in behavioral
modification facilities, such as those in the cases discussed above, are often
inadequately educated, subjected to humiliating and ineffective "therapy," and
even abused. 12 6 Many such programs are not state certified, are exempt from
licensing requirements, and are staffed by untrained teachers using poor
education materials. 127 A recent General Accountability Office (GAO) investiga-
tion found that in some facilities, mandated special education services were not
122. J.M. v. Kingsway Reg'1 Sch. Dist., No. 04-4046, 2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 18110, at *2, 5-6 (D.N.J. Aug.
18, 2005).
123. Id. at *16. The school, SunHawk Academy, describes itself as an "Adolescent Recovery Center" for
youth with substance abuse issues. SuNHAwK ADOLESCENT RECOVERY CENTER, http://www.sunhawkrecovery.
com (last visited Jan. 22, 2011).
124. J.M., 2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 18110, at *1; see also W. Windsor-Plainsboro Reg'1 Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ.
v. J.S., No. Civ. 04-3459, 2005 WL 2897494, at *4, 19-20 (D.N.J. Oct. 31, 2005) (holding that a residential
school was not educationally necessary where parents unilaterally placed their teenaged daughter in a very
restrictive residential school with unclear educational credentials because of her alcohol abuse, sexual activity,
and other behaviors outside of the school environment, although she had maintained decent grades and school
attendance).
125. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, RESIDENTIAL FACILITIES: IMPROVED DATA AND ENHANCED
OVERSIGHT WOULD HELP SAFEGUARD THE WELL-BEING OF YOUTH WITH BEHAVIOR AND EMOTIONAL CHALLENGES
79 (2008) [hereinafter GAO REPORT], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08346.pdf (citing Depart-
ment of Education data showing that in the Fall of 2006, 9373 students aged six through twenty-one with
"emotional disturbance" were placed in private residential facilities). In fact, the child at issue in a recent high
profile Supreme Court case was placed by his parents in a behavior modification facility, which has since been
closed permanently following an investigation by the State of Oregon revealing conditions seriously
endangering children's health and safety. See Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 129 S. Ct. 2484, 2488 (2009);
Amy Hsuan, Mount Bachelor Academy in Prineville to Close by Dec. 9, OREGONIAN, Nov. 9, 2009, available at
http://www.oregonlive.com/business/index.ssf/2009/ll/prineville-boarding-school-to.html. The Court ruled
that the parents could be reimbursed for the child's education in the facility without addressing whether such a
placement was appropriate for the child. Forest Grove, 129 S. Ct. at 2496.
126. See, e.g., GAO REPORT, supra note 125, at 3; BAZELON CENTER FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAw, U.S SUPREME
COURT TO DECIDE FOREST GROVE V. T.A.: PARENTS SHOULD WIN, BUT BAZELON CENTER OPPOSES THERAPEUTIC
BOARDING SCHOOLS (2009), available at http://bazelon.org.gravitatehosting.com/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=
Ch60k9tJe9s%3d&tabid 321 (citing statistics showing that these facilities are ineffective at addressing the
mental health and education needs of the youth placed there and that a high number of abusive and even fatal
incidents have been reported at such facilities).
127. BAZELON CENTER FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW, supra note 126.
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provided.12 8 Numerous states do not monitor the educational programming at
such facilities, nor does the federal government. 12 9
Thus, any parent advocating for such a placement for her child-no matter
how well intentioned-is arguably acting against her child's legal interests to a
FAPE in the Least Restrictive Environment. 130 Attorneys in such situations are
not only failing to recognize the conflict between parent and child, but are also
violating the requirement that they advocate for the least restrictive environment
for clients with diminished capacity. 13 1
2. PARENT AN) CHILD DISAGREE OVER EDUCATIONAL GoALs AND SERVICES
Conflicts may also arise between a parent and child where they have different
opinions as to the appropriate placement or differing educational priorities.132
For instance,. a child may feel he learns better with familiar teachers and peers
whereas a parent may feel it is in his best interests to change placements.' 3 3 Since
the parent and child have separate claims under Winkelman, and the Model Rules
mandate that many children be treated like regular clients entitled to direct their
representation,134 a conflict may arise if the parent and the minor directly
disagree on an issue of classification or placement. The lawyer cannot advocate
two opposing viewpoints simultaneously, and thus his representation of one party
would "materially limit" his responsibilities to the other.13 5
One area of potential disagreement is the identification of the need for special
education, and a student's classification with a particular disability. These
decisions entitle a child to services, but also may carry a stigma.13 6 Thus, where
the parent advocated for a child's designation as disabled with an "emotional
128. GAO REPORT, supra note 125, at 17-18 (as of 2008 when the study concluded).
129. Id. at 4, 25. However, the abuses and safety risks documented in the GAO reports and testimony have
inspired federal legislation to address these problems. See Stop Child Abuse in Residential Programs for Teens
Act of 2009, H.R. 911, 111th Cong. (2009).
130. Woodhouse, supra note 104, at 492-98 (arguing that parents' right to direct their child's education
should not include the power to send them to behavior modification facilities where they are at risk of harm, and
there is no showing that such facilities are necessary or effective).
131. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 1.14 cmt.7 (2010) [hereinafter MODEL RULEs]. Commentators
have also noted the attempt to place one family member in a residential facility over her objections to be a
conflict in the elder law setting. Batt, supra note 79, at 327.
132. There is very little case law addressing these types of conflicts, probably because the fact that children
generally are not represented by counsel (individually or jointly) in these proceedings means that their
viewpoints are often not even part of the record. Even where courts do appoint a GAL/attorney due to a potential
conflict, they often do not expressly outline the child's views. However, in many of the cases of potential
conflict outlined above, the child likely disagrees with the educational placement that the parent is seeking. See,
e.g., Ashland Sch. Dist. v. Parents of Student R.J., 585 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1223-25 (D. Or. 2008).
133. Tandy & Heffernan, supra note 12, at 1403.
134. See infra notes 171-91and accompanying text.
135. MODEL RULES R. 1.7(a).
136. See MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, ExcLusioN, AND AMERICAN I.AW 36
(1990).
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disturbance" so that the child could receive services, and the child believed this
designation was not appropriate and that he did not require special education
services, there was a conflict between the two parties.13 7 There, the court
appointed an attorney/GAL for the child and allowed the mother to proceed pro
se-although it did not expressly note a conflict between the two-and found the
teenager not to be emotionally disturbed nor eligible for special education
services. 13
3. PARENT IS UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO ADVOCATE FOR HER CHILD'S
EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS
The area of potential conflict most frequently resulting in the appointment of
an attorney/GAL for the child is where the parent is unable or, more often,
unwilling to advocate for her child's FAPE.13 9 (Yet even here courts and hearing
officers are reluctant to identify conflicts.) Because the special education scheme
is premised on parental advocacy, parents are expected to cooperate with school
districts in the statutory procedures.14 0 Their failure to do so can cause delays and
disputes that hinder the child achieving FAPE.14' As one. court found where the
mother's "spite or distrust"of the school district caused her to delay proceedings
and frequently change her position: "Even a cursory review of the administrative
record reveals two ugly truths: 1) those involved in planning Ariel's educational
program seem to be unable to agree on the best educational program for Ariel;
and 2) Ariel has suffered for it."14 2 Parents of children with disabilities may feel
overwhelmed by the system or by the child's needs and may be unable or
137. St. Joseph-Ogden Cmty. High Sch. Dist. No. 305 v. Janet W., No. 07-CV-2079, 2008 WL 170693, at
*7-8 (C.D. Ill. Jan. 17, 2008) (noting that the child stated that he had no disability, was not currently depressed,
and was not currently receiving special education, which was "okay by him").
138. Id. at *7, 13-15.
139. The special education system is complex and difficult to navigate, especially for those without ample
resources. Thus, most courts do not find a conflict unless the parent's behavior seems willful or extremely
detrimental to the child, and I do not argue that they should find conflicts outside of these scenarios. To
determine otherwise, and over-identify conflicts, would paralyze the advocacy system with a lack of any
representation, especially for poorer families. Instead, families should be assisted in obtaining the information
and resources necessary to best ensure an appropriate education for all children with disabilities.
140. Tucker v. Bay Shore Union Free Sch. Dist., 873 F.2d 563, 565, 567 (2d Cir. 1989).
141. Scholars have also noted a potential conflict between parents and children in the delinquency realm
when a parent misunderstands the law and, as a result, counsels his child or directs the case in a manner not
consistent with the child's legal interests. See, e.g., Henning, supra note 8, at 851-52. One commentator has
posited that there is a conflict of interest between a parent and a child in delinquency cases where a parent is
merely "apathetic"-this is even more the case in IDEIA matters that are expressly premised on parental
advocacy and in which children are not entitled to independent counsel, as they are in delinquency cases. See
Moore, supra note 12, at 1840. These arguments are also analogous in some ways to the arguments against
allowing a parent to represent her child pro se. See supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text.
142. Ariel B. v. Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist., 428 F. Supp. 2d 640, 659 (S.D. Tex. 2006). Despite the judge's
obvious frustration with the mother's refusal to advocate appropriately for the daughter, and his note that a prior
judge on the case had made great efforts in working on this issue with no effect, he did not appoint a
GAL/attorney for the daughter, whose interests were presumably represented only by her mother's attorney. Id.
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unwilling to attend education conferences and hearings or utilize other proce-
dural remedies. 14 3 Likewise, a parent's difficulty in appropriately controlling a
child and ensuring his attendance at school also raises a risk of conflict if the
same attorney is representing both parties." All of these situations can result in
the child not receiving the placement, services, or least restrictive environment to
which she is entitled. 145
The child's rights under the IDEIA outweigh the parent's rights and role as an
advocate under the statutory scheme where the parent repeatedly has demon-
strated that she cannot fulfill that role and is harming the legal interests of her
child.14 6 Accordingly, the court in Muse' B. ex rel. Hanna B. appointed a
GAL/counsel for an autistic child where the mother was taking "irrational and
inconsistent positions," thus making it impossible to implement a consent decree
that would help her son. 14 7 The mother had discharged numerous pro bono
attorneys appointed to represent them. 148 Finding that "a legal challenge under
the IDEA. . .requires the presence of a trained legal advocate to assist the child,"
and having made numerous efforts to "preserve [the mother's] role as an advocate
for her child," the court decided that the child needed separate counsel/GAL.14 9
The court appointed one, despite its stated concern for preserving the mother's
parental rights because "[t]he compelling circumstances in this case substantially
outweigh any perceived infringement on the parental rights of [the] mother."15 0
In sum, the presumption and practice that parents and children are largely one
143. See, e.g., Application of a Child with a Disability, Appeal No. 09-110, at 2-3 & n.3 (N.Y State Educ.
Dep't Nov. 24, 2009), available at http://www.sro.nysed.gov/decisionindex/2009/09-1 10.pdf (explaining that a
guardian ad litem was appointed to protect the child's interest because, inter alia, the purported parent was
"difficult[]" to "deal[] with," and did not appear at a scheduled IEP meeting, resolution session, and impartial
hearing).
144. Id. at 2 n.3. This would have to be limited to extreme cases, however, to avoid punishing a large number
of parents of older children whose school attendance may be difficult to enforce.
145. A parent's obstruction can also hurt the child's case in other ways. For instance, a parent's failure to
cooperate with the school district and produce the child for updated evaluations can be grounds to deny a request
for private school tuition reimbursement. Id.
146. Muse' B. ex rel. Hanna B. v. Upper Darby Sch. Dist., No. 06-CV-00343, 2007 WL 2973709, at *4 (E.D.
Pa. Feb. 14, 2007) ("Even assuming the appointment of a [GAL/counsel for the child] in this case could be
viewed as somehow infringing on the parental rights of Muse' B's mother, there is an overriding and compelling
need that [the child's educational placement] be resolved in a timely manner consistent with goals of the
IDEA.").
147. See Muse' B. ex rel. Hanna B. v. Upper Darby Sch. Dist., 282 F. App'x 986, 989 (3d Cir. 2008)
(affirming district court's appointment of a GAL).
148. Muse' B., 2007 WL 2973709, at *1-3. Interestingly, sometimes the court refers to these attorneys as
representing the child, sometimes as representing the mother, and sometimes as representing both the child and
mother.
149. Id. at *4-5. Although the court granted the GALicounsel final authority on matters relating to the
consent decree, it ordered that she consult with the mother on all matters and advise her of any developments in
the case. Id. at *5. This would seem to conflict with the attorney's duty of confidentiality to the child client under
the Model Rules and other standards. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
150. Muse'B., 2007 WL 2973709, at *5 ("[The appointment] is narrowly tailored to protect the right of [the]
mother as a parent in all other aspects of [the child's] life.").
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unit in education cases both obscures conflicts and poses other ethical quandaries
for attorneys because it is at odds with the current individualistic representation
framework under the Model Rules and other standards. In the next Part, I critique
the individualistic representation model and propose instead a family-oriented
representation framework.
III. A FAMILY-CENTERED REPRESENTATION FRAMEWORK
The importance of what representation framework attorneys follow cannot be
overstated-representation models can greatly influence who the clients are, the
attorneys' duties and practices, and the outcomes of cases.' 5  No representation
model perfectly fits the messy reality of families-particularly the relationship
between parents and children. 15 2 The needs and abilities of a parent and a
severely disabled, non-verbal young child will be very different from those of
parents and a teenager with a moderate disability.
To address the under-identification of parent-child conflict, several commenta-
tors have recommended expanding the appointment of GALs/independent
counsel for children so that it is automatic in certain types of special education
cases, or even in all cases where the family challenges the school district.153
These remedies, however, are too sweeping because the presumption that the
interests of parents and children are aligned is usually correct in these cases. The
problem is not the presumption itself-rather, it is the fact that children's voices
are not heard so that instances where the presumption fails are uncovered. 15 4
Thus, a better solution is to expand the range of representation models, giving
151. Teresa Stanton Collett, And the Two Shall Become As One ... Until the Lawyers Are Done, 7 NoTRE
DAME J.L. ETHics & PuB. Pol'y 101, 119-22 (1993); Stephen Ellmann, Client-Centeredness Multiplied:
Individual Autonomy and Collective Mobilization in Public Interest Lawyers'Representation of Groups, 78 VA.
L. RaV. 1103, 1120-22 (1992) (arguing that lawyers have great power to affect a client's interests and outcomes
by their characterization of the representation).
152. Because the parent-child relationship varies so much as the child matures, and yet is more permanent
than many other family relationships, such as marriage, it presents unique complexities.
153. See, e.g., Justin J. Farrell, Note, Protecting the Legal Interests of Children When Shocking, Restraining,
and Secluding Are the Means to an Educational End, 83 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 395 (2009) (recommending
appointment of a GAL in cases of behavior restraints for children with autism); Charles J. Russo, The Rights of
Non-Attorney Parents Under the IDEA: Winkelman v. Parma City School District, 221 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 15
(2007) (proposing that school boards should seek appointment of a GAL for each student with an JEP when
challenges arise to "attempt[] to sever the interests of children from those of their parents[,]" thus hopefully
avoiding unnecessary litigation). Professor Russo's suggestion seems to posit a child's GAL/counsel as
assisting school boards in settling these cases, thus assuming that the school board will often be acting in the
child's interests when the parent is not. However, this assumption is not always correct; the child is a distinct
third party and sometimes her interests do not align with those of either the parent or the school district. In fact,
the school district has a financial interest in providing the lowest legally permissible level of services to a
child-something that is usually not in the child's interest.
154. See supra note 5.
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families more choice and attorneys more tools to meet their clients' needs.155
Scholars have posited a family representation model in the context of other
family relationships, such as dual spousal representation and the intergenera-
tional representation of parents and adult children. 15 6
As outlined below, a family representation model can bring virtually the same
benefits to most families in education and similar cases as individualistic
representation-and do so more economically. It does so by balancing a parent's
interest in and right to rear her child with the child's voice and claim, as a party
with a real interest, to participate in effective advocacy for an appropriate
education. This holistic framework for families would also align the doctrinal
presumption with attorneys' ethical obligations and allow conflicts to be better
identified and resolved, resulting in improved outcomes for families."5 To these
ends, I propose changes to the Model Rules and attorney practice to allow for
family representation.158
A. LIMITATIONS OF INDIVIDUALISTIC REPRESENTATION
1. THE CURRENT INDIVIDUALISTIC REPRESENTATION MODEL
a. Model Rules of Professional Conduct
The Model Rules posit one attorney for one client and disfavor joint
representation. 15 9 The lawyer's primary duties of loyalty, confidentiality, and
zealous advocacy adhere to his single client. As the oft-quoted phrase puts it: The
155. There are other possible solutions to the representation problems in the education context discussed
herein, such as amendments to the IDEIA to more clearly articulate to whom which rights belong and when and
to whom counsel should be appointed. A full exploration of these ideas is beyond the scope of this Article, but
they would complement, rather than supplant, a changed representation model to best further the educational
rights of children.
156. See supra note 9.
157. Of course, family representation will not work for all families. Thus, lawyers and families would not be
required to choose one or the other, but rather an expanded range of options would allow lawyers to address the
varied reality of families and best represent children and parents. See Collett, supra note 151, at 124 (opining
that the family representation model should not be the "required norm" for estate planning representation, but
acknowledging that it should be permissible for an attorney and clients to choose it).
158. Similar results in terms of expanded joint representation could possibly be achieved by an interpretation
of attorney duties to parents as including duties to non-client children, similar to the duties of counsel for a
fiduciary to a beneficiary, and sanctioning attorneys who did not comply. See infra note 187. I am arguing here
for a changed representation model rather than expanded duties to non-clients because a family representation
model would alter the process of representation to explicitly include the child as a party and to recognize her
voice in educational matters, which according further fiduciary duties to attorneys would not necessarily
achieve.
159. Commentators have termed this the "'one lawyer for each client' ideal." Cahn & Tuttle, supra note 6, at
101; see also Kell, supra note 76, at 367 (arguing that the Model Rules fail to account for human
interdependence). Under this framework, the representation of multiple clients in a matter is disfavored. MODEL
RuLEs R. 1.7 cmt. 29.
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lawyer "knows but one person in all the world, and that person is his client."16 0
Accordingly, the representation of multiple parties in the same matter is
discouraged because, inter alia, the attorney will likely be unable to meet his
duties of confidentiality and loyalty to both clients if one client requests that she
not disclose relevant information to the other client.16 1
In keeping with the individualistic bent of the Model Rules, their definition of a
conflict is broad, thereby favoring individual representation over compromise
and dual representation. 16 2 A lawyer's duty to current or former clients, her
responsibilities to third parties, or her own interests may lead to a conflict.163 A
conflict exists where the interests of the two clients or parties are directly adverse
or if there is a significant risk that the lawyer's duties to one would "materially
limit" his responsibilities to another.I In the parent-child situation, conflicts can
arise either where the parties are jointly represented by the same attorney or,
equally common, where the child is being represented but the parent is an
interested third party.165 Payment for representation by a third party is prohibited
unless the client gives informed consent, confidentiality is protected, and "there
is no interference with the lawyer's independence of professional judgment or
with the client-lawyer relationship."166 In assessing whether a conflict exists
when representing multiple plaintiffs in the same matter, as with a parent and
child in an education case, attorneys should take into account the availability of
substantially different possibilities of settlement. 6 7 There is almost always some
risk of conflict between co-plaintiffs in civil litigation, as they could substantially
disagree over settlement,168 but the conflict may be waived. Clients cannot waive
a conflict where the lawyer reasonably believes she will be unable to represent
each client competently and diligently.16 9
160. Collett, supra note 7, at 1462 (quoting the famous statement of Lord Brougham).
161. MODEL RuLEs R. 1.7 cmts. 30-31; see also Collett, supra note 151, at 124, 141-42 (joint representation
is "necessarily superficial" because of the tension caused by the attorney's duties to the multiple parties).
162. In fact, as Professor Russell Pearce notes, "the very existence of conflicts rules illustrate the individual
orientation of legal ethics." Pearce, supra note 6, at 1278.
163. MODEL RULEs R. 1.7 cmt. 9.
164. MODEL RULES R 1.7(a).
165. Moore, supra note 12, at 170-71.
166. MODEL RULEs R. 1.8. Of course, often the parent will be paying for an attorney for the child. She can
then decide to terminate the representation when a conflict arises between the child's wishes and her own. See
Tandy & Heffernan, supra note 12, at 1403-04 (giving an example of such a scenario). In such a situation,
however, the attorney could petition the court for an attorney to be appointed for the child, although some courts
might not do so if the parent proceeds on her claims, depending upon the court's interpretation of Winkelman.
But see State Bar of Mich. Standing Comm. on Prof'l and Judicial Ethics, Op. RI-140 (1992) (finding that the
child is the client even where the mother retains the attorney, and thus the attorney cannot drop a valid claim for
the child at the mother's direction).
167. MODEL RULES R. 1.7 cmts. 8-10.
168. Moore, supra note 12, at 1833 n.70.
169. MODEL RULEs R. 1.7.
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b. Model Rule 1.14
Attorneys for children are subject to the same rules of professional conduct as
other attorneys-the Model Rules make no exception to the principles of
individual loyalty and zealous advocacy for parents and children. Even parents
who pay for representation of their children are not permitted to direct the
representation. 170 In fact, the Model Rules scarcely mention the unique chal-
lenges and responsibilities of representing minors, except in Rule 1.14 governing
clients with diminished capacity. 171 The standard for diminished capacity is high,
and thus many minors would not even qualify as being of diminished capacity. 17 2
A client's insistence on a view of her own interests that the lawyer considers
unwise should not be taken as evidence of incompetence.17 3 Rather, a child is
only unable to direct her own case when she "clearly . . . is not capable of
understanding the nature of the case or the significance of the decisions
concerning the representation."17 4 A parent may be "appointed" as a child's legal
representative for the direction of a case only when the child meets this high
standard of diminished capacity.'7 5
Even when representing individuals with diminished capacity, attorneys must
conform to the traditional attorney representation model as closely as possible. 17 6
This includes directing the objectives of the case, per Model Rule 1.2. The
Comment to Rule 1.14 clarifies that even clients with diminished capacity "often
[have] the ability to understand, deliberate upon, and reach conclusions about
matters affecting [their] own well-being[,]" noting that the opinions of children
as young as five and certainly those of ten- or twelve-year-olds are routinely
given weight in custody proceedings.' 7 7 An attorney should thus communicate
with and treat a person of diminished capacity as a client even where the client
170. Moore, supra note 12, at 1856.
171. As a result, the Model Rules have been criticized as diminishing parental rights by allowing attorneys to
disregard the parents' views in favor of the child's. See Hafen, supra note 92, at 447. Nor do the Model Rules
make exceptions for other family members. See, e.g., Dolgin, supra note 88, at 50 ("[L]awyers representing
spouses must see even their most apparently traditional clients as individuals whose conjoined interests
potentially conflict.").
172. See, e.g., Or. State Bar Ass'n Bd. of Governors, Formal Op. 2005-159 (2005) ("Short of a client's being
totally noncommunicative or unavailable due to his condition, a lawyer can most often explain the decisions that
the client faces in simple terms and elicit a sufficient response to allow the lawyer to proceed with the
representation.").
173. RESTATEMENT (THRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 24 cmt. c (2000).
174. State Bar of Mich. Standing Comm. on Prof'l and Judicial Ethics, Op. RI-140 (1992).
175. See also Henning, supra note 8, at 880 (opining that the Model Rules only allow for reliance on the
parents for direction where the child is incompetent and the parents have no legal, financial, or psychoemotional
interests conflicting with those of the child and can be objective in evaluating the child's options).
176. MODEL RULEs R. 1.14; see also Hawkins v. Principi, No. 03-2108, 2004 U.S. App. Vet. Claims LEXIS
94, at *5 (Vet. App. Feb. 20, 2004) ("Model Rule [1.14] suggests that counsel should maintain [the
attorney-client] relationship as normally as possible.").
177. MODEL RULES R. 1.14 cmt. 1. Children's opinions on other important matters are taken into account or
are even determinative. For instance, virtually all states require that children of a certain age consent to their
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has a legal representative, such as a parent.
Moreover, although attorneys may "look to parents as natural guardians" and
legal representatives for children with diminished capacity in some cases where
their interests are not at odds, the parents' decision-making power is still quite
limited by the Model Rules-the lawyer must allow the client the maximum
decision-making power possible.179 For instance, where a mother retained a
lawyer to bring a medical malpractice suit alleging injury to her thirteen-year-old
child with a learning disability, the state bar ethics committee found that the
child, not the mother, was the client: "If it is the child's claim that is being
investigated then it is the child who is the client and the lawyer's first
responsibility is toward the child."180 This was in contrast to the attorney's
assumption that the mother was his client, because she had retained him and
signed the contingent fee contract. Thus, when the mother wanted to drop the
claim, the attorney could not do so where this would be against the child's
interests or direction.18 1
Particularly pertinent to the special education context, attorneys must at all
times be aware of any law requiring them to advocate for the least restrictive
option for a client.18 2 Relatedly, the Model Rules allow protective action on
behalf of a client with diminished capacity, including consulting with family
members or seeking appointment of a GAL, only when a high standard is
met-the lawyer reasonably believes her client is at risk of substantial harm and
cannot act in his own interest or maintain a normal attorney-client relationship.18 3
Even then, the GAL or parent's decision-making power is not absolute-the
attorney should still independently determine the client's interests, monitor the
guardian's assertion of those interests, and periodically assess the client's
competence.18 4 At least one court has found that the attorney for a child-even a
very young child-may advocate a position different from that of the child's
GAL.185 The GAL argued that because she was appointed as the child's legal
representative, the attorney was bound to follow the GAL's position; however,
own adoption, some as young as age ten. See, e.g., ARK. CODE. ANN. § 9-9-206 (2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-49
(West 2002).
178. MODEL RULES R. 1.14 cmt. 2.
179. MODEL RuLES R. 1.14 cmts. 3-5, 7.
180. State Bar of Mich. Standing Comm. on Prof'1 and Judicial Ethics, Op. RI-140 (1992).
181. Id.
182. See MODEL RuLEs R. 1.14 cmt. 7.
183. See MODEL RuLEs R. 1.14 cmts. 5, 7; MODEL RULEs R. 1.14(b); see also Katherine Hunt Federle,
Righting Wrongs: A Reply to the Uniform Law Commission's Uniform Representation of Children in Abuse,
Neglect, and Custody Proceedings Act, 42 FAM. L.Q. 103, 105 (2008) (noting high standard for protective action
under Rule 1.14).
184. Or. State Bar Ass'n Bd. of Governors, Formal Op. 2005-159 (2005).
185. Schult v. Schult, 699 A.2d 134, 139-42 (Conn. 1997). The child in the custody dispute between the
Schults was a three-year-old with psychological and developmental problems. Id. at 135. It is not clear why the
court appointed a GAL in addition to an attorney for the child, but the child's young age and disabilities could
have led the court to presume the child was incapacitated.
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the court found that although this would ordinarily be the case, attorneys were not
required to look to the child's guardian for guidance in every case.186 This same
principle is applicable to parents who are the legal representatives of children-
attorneys may look to them for guidance but should not follow their direction if it
would be against the child's interests. Finally, even if the lawyer represents only
the parent, not the child, he "may have an obligation" to prevent or correct action
adverse to the non-client child's interests.18 7
All the regular duties of a lawyer, including confidentiality of information, are
due the child client.18 8 Accordingly, another state bar ethics committee ruled that
a lawyer for a minor in a delinquency case could not disclose confidential
information to the minor's parent/legal guardian unless the information was
necessary to make a legally binding decision about the subject matter of the
representation and the lawyer believed that the parent was acting in the minor's
interests.189 In sum, the fact that a client is a minor is "immaterial" unless she is
so young or disabled that she is of diminished capacity and unable to understand
the case.190
186. Id. at 142.
187. MODEL RuLEs R. 1.14 cmt. 4 (attorneys for parents may have some fiduciary duties to children who are
not their clients). Ethical rules for lawyers representing parents in other situations also imply such a duty. For
instance, aspirational ethical guidelines for matrimonial attorneys posit that the attorneys for parents in custody
and related actions have a "fiduciary duty for the well being of a child" and thus "must competently represent
the interests of the client, but not at the expense of the children." AM. ACAD. OF MATRIMONIAL LAWYERS
(AAML), THE BouNDs OF ADVOCACY. CHILDREN § 6 (2000), available at http://www.aaml.org/sites/default/files/
AAML Chapter_Handbook Tab_6_BoundsAdvocacy.pdf; see also id. at Preliminary Statement (stating that
attorneys for parents in matrimonial matters should consider the well being of the children in counseling the
client as to her best interests and noting that many such attorneys view themselves as obligated to act in the
children's best interests as well as advocating for their client's goals). This duty is based in part on the analogous
duty of an attorney for a trustee or fiduciary to the beneficiaries to whom the fiduciary is obligated. Since parents
have a fiduciary duty to act in their children's best interests, attorneys for parents have the same obligatioh. Id.
§ 6. Accordingly, the guidelines recommend that "an attorney representing a parent should consider the welfare
of, and seek to minimize the adverse impact of the divorce on, the minor children." Id. Part of this obligation
includes a duty to counsel the parent client against, and to refuse to participate in, multiple evaluations of the
child for the parent's own litigation goals. Id. § 6.1. Although custody disputes are more acrimonious than most
education cases, parents' attorneys in IDEIA cases should similarly be cognizant of their impact on and
obligation to the children who are the subjects of these cases.
188. See, e.g., S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Ethics Advisory Op. 06-06 (2006) (reminding lawyers that
the duty of confidentiality continues to apply to clients with diminished capacity, although "some [minimal]
information may have to be divulged to protect the client's interests"); L.A. County Bar Ass'n Prof'1
Responsibility and Ethics Comm., Formal Ethics Op. 504 (2000), available at www.lacba.org/files/lal/Vol23Nol l/
1171.pdf (looking to Model Rule 1.14 for guidance and concluding that an attorney may not violate
confidentiality to reveal that a competent minor is being sexually abused in her court-ordered foster care
placement, even where the attorney believed that the decision not to disclose was not in the minor's best
interest).
189. N.C. State Bar, Formal Ethics Op. 18 (1999).
190. State Bar of Mich. Standing Comm. on Prof'1 and Judicial Ethics, Op. RI-140 (1992).
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c. Practice Standards for Attorneys Representing Children
As the Model Rules offer little specific guidance on the representation of
minors, attorneys representing children and youth rely heavily on specialized
practice standards developed by various professional organizations and groups of
children's advocates to identify and address ethical representation issues.'91 The
practice standards primarily outline a vision of the child as an autonomous actor
with a right to the full panoply of an attorney's duties to her client.192 This is
consistent with the belief of most children's advocates that a child's attorney
should represent a child's expressed interests or legal interests as a traditional
attorney, not her best interests as a guardian ad litem.19 3 This view is consistent
with Rule 1.14.194 Accordingly, practice standards emphasize that a child's
attorney should be free to exercise "uncompromised representation[,]" including
retaining full authority over her actions per the client's direction, free from the
influences of the court and other parties, even if another party, such as a parent,
pays for the lawyer. 19 5 In order for the child to have the maximum opportunity to
direct the case as an adult client might, attorneys for children not only have a duty
to ensure that the child has the requisite information to make an informed
decision, including counseling and advice, but also "not to overbear [her]
191. Practice guidelines exist both generally, see, e.g., Fordham Recommendations, supra note 11, and for
specific children's practice areas, see, e.g., NAT'LAss'N OF COUNSEL FOR CHILDREN, AMERICAN BAR AssOcLaloN
STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYERS WHo REPRESENT CHILDREN IN ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES (NACC
REVISED VERSION) (1999) [hereinafter NACC STANDARDS], available at http://www.naccchildlaw.org/resource/
resmgr/Docs/juvenilejustice.doc. There are no widely accepted specific educational practice guidelines for
children's attorneys. But see D.C. PRACTICE STANDARDS, supra note 39.
192. See, e.g., Jane M. Spinak, Simon Says Take Three Steps Backwards: The National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws Recommendations on Child Representation, 6 NEV. L.J. 1385 (2005);
Fordham Recommendations, supra note 11, at 1301. But see NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STrE
LAWS, UNIFORM REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN IN ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS ACT (2007),
available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bllarchives/ulc/rarccda/2007_final.pdf (proposing two types of attor-
neys for children-both a traditional "child's atfomey" and a GAL-type "best interests attorney").
193. Fordham Recommendations, supra note 11, at 1301; UNLV Recommendations, supra note 73, at 609. If
a child is unable to express her wishes due to age or disability, the attorney must attempt to determine the child's
wishes in another fashion and advocate accordingly. NACC STANDARDS, supra note 191, at B-4(1). If a child
does not or will not express a preference for an outcome, the attorney shall advocate for the child's legal
interests. Id. at B-4(2); see alsoABA CUSTODY STANDARDS, supra note 62, at IV.B and commentary. Courts have
noted that it is a conflict for an attorney to play the role both of a child's attorney and his or her GAL. See, e.g., In
re S.B., 916 N.E.2d 1110, 1114 (Ohio. Ct. App. 2009) ("[T]he duty of a lawyer to his client and the duty of a
guardian ad litem to his ward are not always identical and, in fact, may conflict." (citation omitted)).
194. This discussion assumes an expressed-interests representation model. Many of the risks of conflict
described herein would not exist under a best interests model as the attorney/GAL would not be bound to follow
the child's direction and could instead advocate for the child's best interests, which might be a position more
deferential to the parents' views.
195. NACC STANDARDS, supra note 191, at G-1 & cmt. The Commentary for G-1 clarifies that the attorney
for a child should never, however, be paid by a child's parent in an abuse/neglect case; see also ABA CUSTODY
STANDARDS, supra note 62, at III.C.
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will."196 Children's expressed or legal interests are represented in many states in
matters involving complex and delicate issues such as abuse or neglect,
delinquency, and custody. Commentators have noted that education cases are also
appropriate for an expressed-interest representation model. 1 9 7 That is, the
attorney should follow the direction of the child client as to the goals of the
education case, rather than following what the attorney or a parent believes to be
the child's best interests.
Because a minor's attorney is bound to represent her legal interests if her
wishes cannot be determined, a conflict may still exist, even if a child does not
express a contrary preference to another party the attorney represents, if the legal
interests of that party and the child conflict. The standards outline a broad array of
impermissible conflicts, including the dual representation of children and parents
in abuse/neglect, custody, delinquency, and status offense cases.19 8 They do not
explicitly prohibit the dual representation of parent and child in education cases,
although the Recommendations from the Fordham Conference on Ethical Issues
in the Legal Representation of Children do identify this as a potential conflict
situation and deem a civil commitment proceeding where the parent is a movant
to be an outright conflict.199
The practice standards are mostly tailored to cases of explicit parent-child
conflict, such as alleged abuse or neglect, and so propose a limited role for
parents. Children's advocates have expanded this bifurcation of parents' and
children's interests to other spheres, such as delinquency.200 They are also,
however, increasingly recommending that attorneys consult parents about a
child's needs and preferences and consider the child in context-acknowledging
that a parent has a role in a child's life even where there is conflict between her
and her child.2 01 Nonetheless, both the Model Rules and specific practice
standards for children do not make exceptions to general conflict rules for parents
and children and allow dual representation only in a narrow category of cases.
Thus, this framework is at odds both with the doctrinal presumption that parents
and children's interests are aligned and with attorney practice in education cases.
196. STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYERS WHO REPRESENT CHILDREN IN ABUSE AND NEGLECr CASES § B-4
& cmt. (1996), available athttp://www.abanet.org/family/reports/standards-abuseneglect.pdf.
197. Tandy & Heffernan, supra note 12, at 1405.
198. Fordham Recommendations, supra note 11, at 1318.
199. Id.
200. See, e.g., Henning, supra note 8.
201. UNLV Recommendations, supra note 73, at II.A.3.e (recommending that, with certain exceptions,
attorneys representing children of diminished capacity give special weight to the parents' opinion of the child's
best interests); see also NACC STANDARDS, supra note 191, at B-4 cmt. (advising attorneys to consult
"significant persons in the child's life" to ascertain the child's needs, goals, and experiences).
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2. A CRTIQUE OF THE INDIVIDUALISTIC MODEL AS APPLIED TO PARENTS AND CHILDREN
The Model Rules and other ethical standards posit the client as entitled to direct
the case without input from another party, unless she meets the high standard for
diminished capacity. This model is at odds with the "real world" of families,
failing to account for family relationships and disfavoring joint representation.20 2
Confusion about their duties can cause the practice of the education bar to
sometimes diverge from ethical guidance. Moreover, individualistic representa-
tion in effect often means representation for parents alone, leading to a failure to
include children in the process and a risk of unidentified conflicts.
Supporters of the individualistic model for families generally assume that all
interested parties have independent representation or joint representation as
narrowly envisioned under the Model Rules. They also often assume that all of
the parties are competent adults. Under these assumptions, the system has several
potential advantages for family members and attorneys. For instance, it best
ensures that the attorney is unimpaired by loyalties to other parties or the group as
a whole. It also follows the usual rights structure of our legal system-one of
individual rather than communal rights.203 Accordingly, in the estate planning
context, Professors Geoffrey Hazard and Teresa Stanton Collett prefer individual-
istic to family representation, arguing that it: (1) is necessary to realize the rights
of individuals; (2) results in the most zealous representation; and (3) reflects the
current family structure, which is characterized by contract not status.204 They
also support this framework as the least ambiguous one for attorneys-
representing one client in a particular matter leaves no question about where
duties of loyalty and confidentiality lie.2 05 By positing the family as a collection
of equal individuals together by choice, the current representation model can also
help to overcome persisting inequities between family members, such as
husbands and wives.206
Analogously, an independent attorney for the child may similarly help to
overcome the historic-and still prevalent-treatment of children as parental
property.207 Accordingly, Professors. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Katherine
202. MODEL RULEs R. 1.7 cmt. 29.
203. As Justice Scalia pointed out in the Winkelman dissent, most constitutional and statutory rights accrue
to individuals rather than groups. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 541 (2007) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
204. Hazard, supra note 7, at 9; Collett, supra note 151, at 123, 128-29 (citing no-fault divorce, inter alia, as
evidence of the contract nature of the modem family). This notion, however, may ignore the ongoing economic
and social power imbalances between men and women in marriages. Professor Collett also points out that
individual representation brings the parties greater privacy, both in terms of communications with the attorney
and decisions about the case. Collett, supra note 7, at 1471.
205. Hazard, supra note 7, at 9; Collett, supra note 151, at 123, 128-29.
206. Dolgin, supra note 88, at 31, 37-38, 54-55 (concluding that this model is preferable because it reflects
the individual presumption dominating contemporary family law, as it relates to marriage).
207. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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Hunt Federle, and others have emphasized the importance of hearing children's
stories and recognizing their unique abilities, rather than focusing only on their
needs and their parents' view of their children's wishes.2 08 Having their own
counsel is a significant step for children in having their voices heard and their
rights enforced.209 Counsel for children can also bring valuable insight to the
court or decision-making body by presenting the child's voice, unfiltered by
parents.2 10
Yet these arguments for independent counsel for children have been made
outside the educational context, for situations where a parent child conflict is
much more likely. For most families in education and similar cases, the
individualistic model's shortcomings outweigh its advantages-family represen-
tation can bring virtually the same benefits and is a more pragmatic and economic
way to structure the attorney-client relationship. Before outlining the individual-
istic model's shortcomings, let me clarify that I am not proposing family
representation for cases such as abuse/neglect or delinquency, where the high risk
of parent-child conflict or the child's interests against incarceration by the state
make independent representation for the child essential. Even in the education
context, collective representation is inappropriate in those limited categories of
cases where there is an irresolvable conflict between the parent and child.211
The individualistic model has numerous failings for both families and
attorneys in the education context. First, as a practical matter, parents and
children are each going to have their own attorneys in very few education
cases-it is economically infeasible and neither party is entitled to appointed
counsel.2 1 2 Because of this, and the fact that joint representation under the current
208. Woodhouse, supra note 19; Federle, supra note 183, at 112 ("It is indisputably good that the child's
voice is heard without an adult filter. . . ."). Numerous other scholars and children's advocates have also called
for recognition of independent legal rights for children. See, e.g., JAMES G. DWYER, THE RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS OF
CHILDREN 63-67 (2006) (proposing expanded relationship rights for children as consistent with the
philosophical framework of adult relationship rights); ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, NOBODY'S CHILDREN: ABUSE AND
NEGLECT, FOSTER DRIFT, AND THE ADOPTION ALTERNATIVE 7 (Beacon Press 1999) (decrying the "blood bias"
which allows the rights of biological parents to override the rights of children to grow up in a safe and nurturing
environment); BARBARA BENNETTr WOODHOUSE, HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT THE TRAGEDY OF CHILDREN's RIGHTS
FROM BEN FRANKLIN To LIONEL TATE (2008) (proposing rights for children based on both their needs and
capacity and incorporating human rights values); Katherine Hunt Federle, The Ethics of Empowerment:
Rethinking the Role of Lawyers in Interviewing and Counseling the Child Client, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1655,
1693-97 (1996) (arguing for a reconceptualization of our rights framework to accord rights to the powerless,
most of all children).
209. See Ross, supra note 90, at 1574-80 (calling for the appointment of independent counsel for children in
a wide range of cases and noting that children have historically not been appointed independent counsel in part
out of deference to parental rights); Federle, supra note 183, at 113 (stating that the child's lawyer "is in the best
position to insist that the child's rights are respected, valued, and considered").
210. Federle, supra note 183, at 112.
211. Nonetheless, in those cases, a family representation model can still facilitate the recognition and
possible resolution of conflicts.
212. See Cahn & Tuttle, supra note 6, at 101 (pointing out the economic burden of having separate counsel
for spouses in estate matters).
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system is limited by broad conflict rules not adapted to the needs of families, the
individualistic model reduces the overall number of people with counsel.2 13
The doctrinal and practice presumptions mean that it is almost always the child
who remains unrepresented while the parent has counsel or proceeds pro se.214 In
the many cases where neither the parent's attorney nor the court inquires into the
child's views, this system effectively silences the child about his educational
placement-a matter of central significance to him. Children, particularly older
ones, are unlikely to buy into an educational plan about which they have not been
consulted. Moreover, this system has costs in terms of the information and
context available to both the parent's attorney215 and, ultimately, the fact
finder.216
Even in the highly unlikely scenario where both parent and child have
independent attorneys despite no irresolvable conflict, the individualistic model
is still not the best model as it focuses on the family's disagreements rather than
its strengths.2 17 In fact, the presence of more attorneys may even create additional
antagonism among the family members. 21 8 Even the proposed solutions to
conflict under the current Model Rules may harm clients, as they leave the parents
and children with the same conflicts and, often, no representation at all for the
family-withdrawal assists only the attorney.21 9 Because it requires families to
be left thus after withdrawal, Professor Thomas Shaffer has argued that the Model
Rules are "corrupting" and promote "irresponsible" lawyering.22 0 Withdrawal
can be especially difficult for children as they have more difficulty than most
adults understanding the attorney role and trusting the nature of the relationship.
As a result, they can be particularly disappointed and harmed when the
213. Commentators have noted an analogous result of the current Model Rules framework in the
representation of elderly clients and/or their families. See, e.g., Batt, supra note 79 (proposing family
representation in part to aid in the ethical representation of elderly clients). There is already a shortage of
competent education counsel, especially for low- and middle-income families. See, e.g., Lynn M. Daggett,
Special Education Attorney's Fees: Of Buckhannon, the IDEA Reauthorization Bills, and the IDEA as Civil
Rights Statute, 8 U.C. DAvis J. Juv. L. & Pol'Y 1, 39-44 (2004).
214. See supra note 106 and accompanying text (courts are reluctant to appoint a GAL/counsel for the child
even where they have identified a conflict). The lack of representation for children is compounded by the fact
that children may not proceed pro se.
215. Collett, supra note 7, at 7.
216. See, for instance, the example outlined in the Introduction, supra.
217. Dolgin, supra note 88, at 34.
218. See Cahn & Tuttle, supra note 6, at 101-02; see also Barbara Ann Atwood, The Uniform Representation
of Children in Abuse, Neglect and Custody Proceedings Act: Bridging the Divide Between Pragmatism and
Idealism, 42 FAM. L.Q. 63, 87 (2008) (noting in the custody context that the appointment of an advocate for a
child can be unnecessary or even harmful in some cases by "introduc[ing] a potentially intrusive, polarizing, and
expensive additional voice in the proceeding").
219. Under the Model Rules, an attorney must cease representing one or both parties when a conflict appears
insurmountable. MODEL RuLEs R. 1.7 cmt. 4. Because an attorney can rarely meet his duties of loyalty and
confidentiality to both clients once a conflict is identified, a conflict usually means the end of representation for
both clients. MODEL RULEs R. 1.7 cmt. 29.
220. Shaffer, supra note 9, at 982.
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relationship is abruptly ended.2 2'
Finally, and most significantly, this model does not adequately account for the
dependent relationship, shared goals, and intertwined rights of children and
parents. Commentators note that the individualistic model works best as applied
to spouses, for instance, who have adopted, or at least not rejected, somewhat
equal roles. 2 2 2 The parent-child relationship differs significantly, and obviously,
from that between two adults in a family relationship. Thus, the arguments for
this representation model in the adult context-that family structures arguably
rest on contract and choice instead of status and that lawyers can no longer
assume that family relationships are hierarchical 223-do not apply with the same
force, if at all, to many parents and their children. Children are not free to leave
their families or neighborhoods and the parent-child relationship, particularly for
younger children, is often appropriately hierarchical.2 24 The fact that a child is
integrally connected to his parents-and that he also has rights to his education-
frequently renders the individualistic model inappropriate in these cases.
The individualistic model also poses considerable risk to attorneys practicing
in this area. The confusion about to whom the attorney owes duties of loyalty and
confidentiality and the failure of many attorneys to consult with the child or
adequately identify conflict mean that some lawyers may be routinely violating
ethical requirements. 2 25 Because joint representation sometimes arises in educa-
tion cases without explicit procedures, and because parents' attorneys likely have
duties to non-client children, the benefits of the individualistic model-its clarity
about to whom loyalty and duties accrue-often do not apply.
In sum, both pragmatic and normative rationales call into question the efficacy
of the individualistic representation model in education cases.
B. A MORE PROMISING APPROACH: FAMILY REPRESENTATION
1. FAMILY REPRESENTATION MODELS
Scholars have proposed a more communitarian representation model, particu-
larly in the spousal estate-planning area, to rectify some of the deficits of the
Model Rules' individual representational framework.2 26 Professor Shaffer de-
221. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 96-404 (1996) (noting that withdrawal
from the representation of clients with diminished capacity, as with some minors, is disfavored); Me. Prof'1
Ethics Comm., Op. 84 (1988) (same).
222. Dolgin, supra note 88, at 54.
223. See, e.g., id. at 40-50.
224. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982) (noting that children are not free to move as adults
are).
225. See supra notes 62-90 and accompanying text (discussing attorney practices).
226. See, e.g., Pearce, supra note 6; Cahn & Tuttle, supra note 6. Although the Model Rules have not been
amended to accommodate these proposals, some scholars have suggested it can take place under an
interpretation of the existing Model Rules. See, e.g., Cahn & Tuttle, supra note 6. Moreover, certain. professional
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cried the disjuncture between the individualistic nature of the Model Rules and
the realities of people's grounding in family groups and communities.22 7 Because
the family is "organic and as prior to individuality[,]" the lawyer's exclusive
focus on individual rights and interests harms clients. 2 2 8 Instead, lawyers should
view the family as the client and work to meet the needs and goals of their clients
with a view towards the group as more than a collection of individual interests.
Family-oriented representation might take several different forms, but the best
model would be one that simultaneously recognizes the family as an entity and
acknowledges that it has individual members.22 9 Some commentators have
outlined models which focus on the family as both a community and a collection
of individuals,2 30 others have proposed treating the family as an entity similar to a
corporation under Model Rule 1.13,231 and some posit both models as beneficial
for families.2 32 Professors Naomi Cahn and Robert Tuttle propose a more
communitarian approach to representation by interpreting ethics codes as
allowing parties to waive most conflicts and allowing one spouse to delegate
decision-making authority, and even participation, to another spouse.2 33 As an
expanded joint representation model, their vision posits the married couple as
something more than the sum of the individuals,.a vision they acknowledge is not
shared by all couples.23 4 They also recognize the possibility of abuses resulting
from this delegation, and they accordingly outline steps the lawyer should take to
ensure that the parties consent to this delegation and communal representation.23 5
The lawyer should abide by this consent except where the spouse with the
delegated authority acts in a way that potentially "substantially injure[s]" the
delegating party.2 36 Although differing as to the scope of waivable conflict under
the current Model Rules, Professor Stephen Hobbs similarly proposes reframing
representation so that the lawyer's duty of loyalty accrues to the family as a
standards for attorneys appear to embrace a similar, more communal vision of client identity and representation.
See Am. COLL.OF TRUST & ESTATE COUNSEL, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
(1993) [hereinafter ACTEC] (outlining "the utility and propriety [in estates and trusts law] of representing
multiple clients, whose interests may differ but are not necessarily adversarial" and the role these lawyers have
"traditionally played as the lawyer for members of a family") (emphasis added)).
227. See Shaffer, supra note 9.
228. Id. at 971, 982-84.
229. See Pearce, supra note 6, at 1295-1300 (outlining various models and proposing his own Optional
Family Representation model).
230. Dolgin, supra note 88, at 37.
231. See, e.g., Batt, supra note 79, at 340; Pearce, supra note 6.
232. Cahn & Tuttle, supra note 6, at 104-05 (stating that both the joint and entity representation models
"offer more constructive options" for married couples).
233. Id. at 98.
234. Id. at 117-19.
235. Id. at 122-29.
236. Id. at 127-28.
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whole, rather than to any individual member.2 37 The lawyer's goal then becomes
to help the family achieve its stated objectives by presenting the pros and cons of
a range of legal options.2 38
Other scholars have advocated representation of the family as an explicit
entity, wherein the lawyer represents the "'best interests' of the family as
determined by the objectives of the majority of family members." 2 39 Dissenting
family members then become derivative or third party non-clients and the lawyer
is responsible for informing all clients that representation is directed towards the
entire family rather than individual family members. 24 0 Professor Russell Pearce
has developed the most sophisticated outline of this model, termed Optional
Family Representation.24 1 Under this framework, families choose whether to be
represented as a group or individually.242 For the former, they must establish that
a bona fide group identity exists and agree that confidentiality will not exist
within the group, while the lawyer must secure informed consent.24 3 As with the
other variations outlined above, communication and voluntary participation are
key to its successful implementation-family members must be kept informed
about the pros and cons of the representation as the case progresses and may
withdraw at any time from the communal representation.2 44
2. BENEFITS OF FAMILY REPRESENTATION FOR PARENTS, CHILDREN, AND ATTORNEYS
A family representation model has not yet been explicitly applied to the parent
and minor child dyad. But similarities exist between education cases and the
estate planning, family business, or elder law situations to which commentators
have applied family representation.24 5 If properly implemented, family represen-
237. Steven H. Hobbs, Family Matters: Nonwaivable Conflicts ofInterest in Family Law, 22 SEATLE U. L.
REv. 57, 85, 90 (1994).
238. Id. at 90.
239. Batt, supra note 79, at 340.
240. Id.
241. Pearce, supra note 6.
242. Id. at 1295-96.
243. Id. at 1312-13.
244. Id. at 1312-18.
245. Any of the above models would work in this context, but the representation framework should require
both parties to participate, even if one is primarily responsible for decision-making. This is essential to
overcome the historic failure to hear children's voices in matters important to them. Thus, a model for parents
and children should not include a delegation of participation as proposed by some commentators in the marital
context (see, e.g., Cahn & Tuttle, supra note 6), unless the child is so young or disabled as to make meaningful
participation impossible. The fact that most of the family representation models are premised on informed
consent is not a barrier to their application to children. Although children are not usually deemed capable of
consenting to or waiving representation of, for instance, waiving conflicts or counsel altogether, they have been
deemed capable of waiving counsel in delinquency matters. See Moore, supra note 12, at 1831, 1834-35;
Wallace J. Mlyniec, A Judge's Ethical Dilemma: Assessing A Child's Capacity to Choose, 64 FoRDHAM L. REv.
1873, 1895 (1996). In other cases, the parents usually waive counsel or conflicts which clearly would be
inappropriate in a family representation situation. Moore, supra note 12, at 1835-38. Moreover, children's
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tation can thus provide a fruitful model for collaboration between the lawyer and
family in realizing entitlements under the IDEIA.24 6 It works because the
presumption is usually right-most parents act in their children's interests.
(Even in cases where parents and children have differing interests, however, a
holistic family-based approach will enable the attorney to better identify conflicts
before engaging in the representation.) Family representation provides benefits to
both families and attorneys by harmonizing the presumption of aligned interests
with the Model Rules and including both parents and children in the process, thus
reducing the risk of ethical standards violations and improving outcomes.
This model benefits children and parents in numerous ways. First, it reflects the
"truth[]" 248 of their relationship to each other and the fact that they share a
common goal in achieving an appropriate education for the child.2 49 It also
accords with the explicit hierarchy in the parent-child relationship-something
commentators have noted works well with family representation. It reflects the
substantive law presumption that parents act in their children's interests and the
"intertwined" nature of the rights of parents and children under the IIDEIA. Yet
family representation also avoids the fallacy of relying only on a parent's view of
the child's needs and wishes and includes the child in the process. Instead, the
model compels family members to think about the interests of the other parties
and to prioritize both individual and group goals. It recognizes the roles of both
parties, empowering children to participate in the representation and ensuring
their voices are heard while respecting parents' rights and central role in
children's lives. 2 5 0 A collaborative framework such as family representation is
practice standards conclude that attorneys can ethically allow a child to waive conflicts, akin to consenting to
family representation, if they reasonably conclude that the child can understand the nature of the conflict and
consequences of joint representation. Fordham Recommendations, supra note 11, at 1319. This is consistent
with Model Rule 1.14, which anticipates that even a client with diminished capacity can give direction and
make decisions on important matters, and cites children as young as five or six weighing in on custody cases.
Accordingly, attorneys in delinquency and abuse/neglect cases often follow an expressed-interest advocacy
model with minor clients, especially older children, despite their legal incapacity to consent. See supra notes
193-98 and accompanying text. Attorneys are usually court-appointed in such cases, so children do not
necessarily consent to representation, but by allowing minors to direct the case, attorneys acknowledge their
ability to make significant decisions about their legal interests. Finally, even where children are too young or
disabled to consent or express views, a family representation model can shift the attorney's focus from the
parents' views alone to incorporating the child's legal interests.
246. I do not propose special ethical rules or exemptions for education cases, as I agree that such rules should
apply as broadly as possible to all areas of practice. See Hazard, supra note 7. Thus, I am using education cases
to illustrate that cases wherein there is no absolute conflict between parents and children (unlike abuse and
neglect cases, for example) could benefit from a more communal representation model.
247. Family representation will not work for all families but approaching representation holistically can aid
in the identification of conflicts, even if the model is not ultimately adopted by the family and attorney in a
particular case. See supra note 212 and infra note 266 and accompanying text.
248. Shaffer, supra note 9, at 984.
249. See Cahn & Tuttle, supra note 6, at 105 (noting that joint or family representation reflects the view of
marriage as a "shared project").
250. This direction, of course, must take into account the child's ability to express her needs and opinions.
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thus particularly suited to the delicate interplay between attorney, parent, and
child. 5 It also comports with the recommendations of some scholars to move
from a rights-based, adversarial framework for systems involving parents and
children to a more problem-solving model, often incorporating alternative
dispute resolution principles.25 2
Second, it allows parents and children to choose multiple representation in
situations which would otherwise be precluded under the Model Rules, thus
increasing the family's ability to self-determine and direct its interaction with
outside entities, such as courts and the school district.2 5 3 Accordingly, family
representation arguably reduces the lawyer's intrusion into the family structure
and the existing tendency of some attorneys to impose their own views on the
representation of various family members.254
Third, family representation is economically more efficient than either
individual or joint representation, since it would result in fewer attorneys yet
ensure that more people are represented. 5 5 By minimizing the scope of conflicts,
it also results in more continuous representation and fewer harmful withdraw-
als. 256
Fourth, by focusing on the family's needs holistically and engaging the child
further in the process, this framework also leads to the best outcomes.2 57 Having
one attorney properly represent both parent and child in an education case can
increase the confidence of each family member in the attorney and make the
difficult process of securing FAPE-especially if the process involves litigation-
more comfortable for both.2 5 8 It is clear that both the parent and child need to be
engaged for the child's education placement to work. The child's interest in
education is obvious and, pragmatically, he may not attend or succeed at school if
he were not involved in the process of advocating for his educational placement.
251. Henning, supra note 9, at 319-20.
252. See, e.g., Clare Huntington, Rights Myopia in Child Welfare, 53 UCLA L. REv. 637 (2006) (discussing
the need for a more collaborative, holistic framework in the child welfare system to best serve children and
families).
253. Pearce, supra note 6, at 1300; Hobbs, supra note 237, at 93; see also discussion infra at pp. 351-53
(suggesting changes to the Model Rules to facilitate family representation).
254. Pearce, supra note 6, at 1299; see also Shaffer, supra note 9, at 987 (decrying the "paternalistic
approach" of many attorneys to families' desires to define themselves by reference to the group rather than the
individual).
255. The importance of the economic justifications for family representation should not be understated-
they outweigh the risks in multiparty representation in many cases. See, e.g., ACTEC, supra note 226 ("[Tjhe
representation of multiple clients by a single lawyer .. . often provides the clients with the most economical and
effective representation-particularly where the clients are members of the same family.").
256. Batt, supra note 79, at 337-38.
257. This assumes the model does not allow a delegation of participation, but simply a delegation of
decision-making authority. See supra note 246.
258. See Report of Working Group on Conflicts ofInterest, 64 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1379, 1385 (1996) (noting in
the abuse/neglect context that attorney representation of multiple siblings where the risk of conflict is low could
assist the children to feel more comfortable about the sensitive family court case, as well as conserve resources).
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Including the child in the representation process thus can reap valuable
procedural justice benefits, leading to more success educationally. 2 5 9 On the other
hand, parents not only have rights to their child's education, but they are also
extremely important for logistical purposes-it is the parents who will be
responsible for bringing a child to school or ensuring she attends. 2 60 Family
representation works by focusing on families' strengths rather than their areas of
discord, thus increasing collaboration and resulting in better advocacy against the
school district for the best educational placement.26 1
In addition to the benefits for parents and children, a family representation
model would reduce the risk for education attorneys and help them best represent
their clients. Explicitly representing the family as a whole both clarifies who the
clients are-parents and child-and avoids the risks of under-identification of
conflicts so endemic in this area. Even a critic of family representation
acknowledged that the dual focus on individual and group interests should inspire
attorneys to be more "aware and careful" of client needs.2 62 The model allows the
attorney to take a more communal view of the case, incorporating the parties'
interests, their concern for other family members, and the parent-child dyad as a
whole.26 3 This holistic approach thus accords both with practice guidelines
urging lawyers for children to consider their clients within the context of their
families and communities and with the reparative lawyering model proposed by
commentators in family law matters.2 It also helps to overcome the tendencies
of both groups of attorneys practicing in this area-parents' attorneys' tendency
to ignore the child's views and children's attorneys' tendency to fail to make use
of parents' knowledge about their children.
Because they communicate with both parties regularly, lawyers working
within this paradigm will also be better informed about both the unified and
disparate views of various family members-making them better equipped to
recognize and address conflicts.26 5 Yet their focus on the family as a whole will
allow them to construe conflicts narrowly, in accordance with the unique
259. Scholars have critiqued a best interests representation model-analogous to a model wherein attorneys
represent parents acting in their child's interests-as alienating children or worse by failing to seek their input.
See, e.g., Henning, supra note 9, at 281-86.
260. It is also the parent, at least in the case of younger children, who will be arranging the child's
transportation to and from attorney appointments. See Henning, supra note 8, at 846.
261. Pearce, supra note 6, at 1300-01. Empowering a child with representation in the family context rather
than individually would also avoid the problem noted by some children's advocates that a child who has her own
lawyer may be more willing to challenge even appropriate parental authority. Emily Buss, Confronting
Developmental Barriers to the Empowerment of Child Clients, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 895, 946-47 (1999).
262. Dolgin, supra note 88, at 55. However, Professor Dolgin is pessimistic that most attorneys can achieve
this.
263. Hobbs, supra note 237, at 63.
264. UNLV Recommendations, supra note 73, at 594; Huntington, supra note 9, at 1309-10. In a reparative
model, the attorney is responsible for considering the interests of even non-client family members in order to
reduce harm to the family and try to meet all of the parties' interests. Id.
265. Dolgin, supra note 88, at 52.
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parent-child relationship. For instance, if a parent believes that his child needs
related services three times a week yet the child wants it only once a week, an
attorney focused on the whole family's needs could work within this framework
rather than seeing it as an irresolvable conflict of litigation goals. She could do so
by counseling parent and child towards common ground and perhaps advocating
for a range of services from the school district that meets the fundamental goals
of both the parents and child. Context is important to conflict analysis because not
every difference is equivalent to a conflict making collective representation
impossible. Attorneys in a family representation model will have the requisite
information to make this key distinction.
3. ArrORNEY PRACTICE CHANGES TO ADDRESS CRITICISMS OF FAMILY REPRESENTATION
Critics of family representation center on five main points.26 6 They argue that:
the family is not a recognized legal entity in contrast to a corporation and that our
legal system depends upon individual, not communal, rights;2 67 the model does
not reflect the contemporary reality of married couples, which are based on
contract and choice rather than status and obligation; 268 it reduces individual
autonomy and consequently can impair zealous advocacy;269 it results in the
stronger parties or the majority overbearing the weaker parties or those in the
minority;270 and it grants attorneys too much discretion to impose their view of
the family's best interests on the clients. 2 71 The first three criticisms do not apply
in the parent-child situation due to the child's legal and inherent dependence on
his parent and the parental right to be part of important decisions for the child.
The last two points are valid concerns but not fatal to a family representation
paradigm. Appropriate attorney practice, including increasing children's partici-
pation in the process by regularly consulting with and keeping all parties
informed, effective counseling, and checking attorney biases, can guard against
these potential problems.
a. Communication and Counseling to Overcome Power Imbalances
Family representation can reinforce existing power imbalances and result in
the domination of some parties by others. However, the structure of the
representation, the fiduciary obligations between the parties, 27 2 and, most
266. Some critics, however, still believe that families should be permitted to choose this form of
representation. See, e.g., Dolgin, supra note 88; Collett, supra note 7.
267. See, e.g., Hazard, supra note 7, at 12-14, 20-21; Dolgin, supra note 88, at 54-55.
268. Collett, supra note 151, at 123-24.
269. See, e.g., Collett, supra note 7, at 1501; Hazard, supra note 7, at 9.
270. Collett, supra note 7, at 1492-93.
271. Id. at 1495.
272. Parents are seen as having fiduciary duties towards children. See Pearce, supra note 6, at 13 10-11; Batt,
supra note 79, at 332; Collett, supra note 7, at 1467 n.68.
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significantly, the attorney's actions can protect against this. The representation
structure should not follow a majority rule, which could, for instance, allow two
parents to override one child every time.2 73 Instead, the attorney should try to
achieve the goals of both parents and children-something that will be possible
274in most cases. He should only agree to representation if he reasonably believes
the parents and child share a common goal of achieving the most appropriate
educational placement for the child, It is then up to the attorney to ensure that the
process is fair and inclusive and that each party is informed about the case and
representation, according to the party's capacity. 2 7 5 In doing so, the attorney
should take into account the varying harms or burdens on various family
members-thus, the party who is at risk of institutionalization or restriction
should arguably have the greatest voice in that matter.276
An important part of effective family representation is regularly keeping all
parties informed and checking in with them to ascertain their educational goals
and ensure their continued voluntary participation in the family representation.
Increasing children's participation in the representation is particularly important
as they have routinely been excluded from determining theiri own educational
goals. Throughout the process, the attorney should keep all of the parties
informed about their respective roles and his own role as their joint advocate. As
noted above, many education attorneys currently do not regularly meet with the
children, even those who are their clients.2 77 This practice should change, and
children should be regularly interviewed in the context of education cases, as
they are in abuse/neglect, delinquency, and other cases in which they are an
interested party. Just as the views of even very young children are solicited and
considered in custody cases, so they should be in education cases. Education
options are similarly central to children's lives, can be framed in easy to
understand terms, and may even involve a more straightforward deliberation and
choice on the child's part, as they do not involve the deeply personal family
bonds and ruptures of a custody case.
In determining the appropriate roles of parents and children, the attorney must
keep in mind the capacity and interests of each. For instance, a child may be able
to express general goals such as progressing academically or improving social
interactions. He may not, however, be capable of articulating the more specific
273. Batt posits majority rule for family representation. See Batt, supra note 79, at 340. However, other
commentators do not adopt this structure.
274. Of course, attorneys must turn down or withdraw from representation in cases in which the family
members' interests cannot be aligned or in which one will not allow another to be kept informed of critical
information. See, e.g., Hobbs, supra note 237, at 92 (stating that sometimes individual family members need
independent counsel to protect their interests).
275. Pearce, supra note 6, at 1311 ("The role of the lawyer would be to protect a minimum level of fairness in
group process."); see infra notes 292-94 and accompanying text.
276. Collett, supra note 7, at 1307 (making this argument in the context of elderly family members).
277. See supra notes 68-90 and accompanying text.
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methods of achieving these goals for an Individualized Education Plan, such as
positive peer interactions as part of a behavioral plan or increasing decoding
skills for reading. These more specific goals may be more appropriate for the
attorney to work through with the parent.27 8 Even extensive parental involvement
in making decisions about the case may be appropriate in certain instances in
which the child's inability to articulate her wishes means that the attorney should
look to the child's guardian for guidance. 7 In such cases, however, the attorney
still has obligations to the child as well, and should not follow the parent's
direction without an independent assessment of the child's legal interests and any
potential conflicts.
Another significant part of any lawyer's role is counseling his clients to best
achieve the clients' goals and protect the clients' legal interests. 2 8 0 When
representing groups such as families, an attorney should use counseling
techniques that both protect the autonomy of individual members and advance
the interests of the group.281 This counseling role is often heightened in the case
of children, depending upon their age and capacity.282 An attorney who consults
with each family member and investigates the child's disability, needs, and
educational options can then appropriately counsel the family as to options,
thereby likely leading the family to collectively make the right choice.2 83
Sometimes this may entail dissuading one of the parties from pursuing a course
of action that is inappropriate and unwarranted by the law and facts in the case.
For instance, a lawyer could explain to a child why a hearing officer will not
allow her to forego special education services if she has a well documented
learning disability that impairs her academic performance. He can then work with
the child to identify services that may be more palatable to her than a segregated
classroom, and advocate for such services using the least restrictive environment
mandate. In addition to achieving the best outcomes for the child, effective
counseling can help the child improve her decision-making abilities.28 4
Counseling can also assist attorneys in overcoming differences in the parties'
views, thus reducing conflicts. To this end, an attorney will need to investigate the
278. Tandy & Heffernan, supra note 12, at 1406.
279. MODEL RULEs R. 1.14 cmts. 3-4.
280. See MODEL RuLEs R. 2.1.
281. Ellmann, supra note 151, at 1132.
282. NACC STANDARDS, supra note 191, at B-4(4) cmt. (stating that lawyers for children should counsel
their clients when the child's position is "wholly inappropriate" or "could result in serious injury" and that, in so
doing, most lawyers can persuade the child to change her position).
283. Numerous agencies engaging in education advocacy use counseling successfully to align children's and
parents' interests. Lawyers must be careful, however, not to impose undue influence on either of the parties,
especially the child, who by definition is more susceptible to the opinions of others, especially a parent, attorney,
or other adult in a powerful position. NACC STANDARDS, supra note 191, at B-2 cmt. (noting that when
counseling a child client, the attorney "should be careful not to apply undue pressure to a child").
284. See Henning, supra note 9, at 308-09. This is true even for clients of limited capacity. See Buss, supra
note 261, at 905.
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reasons for the divergence of opinions and try to find a zone of agreement to
present to the adversary andlor the court. For instance, if the parents and child
have a shared goal of improving the child's reading ability, but disagree on the
methods, the attorney can work with them to agree upon a range of options-
different programs with different levels of restrictiveness and different hours-
which can then be presented to the hearing officer or court.
b. Checking Biases to Limit Overextension of the Attorney Role
A second major concern of critics is that family representation cedes lawyers
too much discretion to determine the interests or goals of the parent-child dyad
since the lawyer is not taking the straight direction of any one client.2 8 5 How an
attorney receives and gives information to each client and how she determines the
family's goals and objectives can effectively put the attorney in charge of the
family decisions. A determination of whether a party's position has merit or not
always has some element of subjectivity. In cases involving children, however,
the risk of the attorney's views inappropriately influencing her counsel is
heightened-the attorney may impose on the family her own views about what is
best for a child or about the parental role.28 6
To guard against this tendency, the lawyer has to be aware of her biases and
check against the tendency to import her values into the goals of the
representation. If she limits her inquiry to whether a party's education goals for
the child are really warranted under the statute, given the child's disability,
academic progress, et cetera-the kind of professional judgment attorneys
routinely make about the viability of a particular position-she can avoid
overreaching in her role. Implementing a transparent and routine decision-
making process for the family in advance will also assist in checking attorney
biases.2 87
C. CHANGES TO THE MODEL RULES TO EXPAND OPTIONS FOR FAMILIES
Approaching representation from a family-centered perspective and the
concomitant practice changes outlined above will go a long way towards
expanding options for families under the existing ethical standards. However,
amendments to the Model Rules and comments can further these aims by
clarifying that families can choose to be represented together in a broader array of
circumstances than is currently possible and that lawyers have additional
285. Collett, supra note 7, at 1495 ("Nowhere else are lawyers permitted such broad-ranging discretion in
defining the objectives of representation.").
286. See, e.g., Guggenheim, supra note 8, at 833; see also UNLV Recommendations, supra note 73, at 609
(advising attorneys against such a practice).
287. See infra notes 292-94 and accompanying text.
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obligations in such scenarios. 2 8 8 This Part proposes such amendments 289 and
illustrates how this might play out in practice by returning to the example
outlined in the Introduction of a teenager whose parents seek to place her in an
out-of-state residential "behavior management" school.
The Model Rules could be amended to clarify the processes and obligations of
family representation via changes to Rule 1.13 to serve the family as a unit or to
Rules 1.7, 1.8 and/or 1.14 to expand joint representation. I have chosen here to
include them as part of Rule 1.8 governing specific issues of conflicts of interest
for current clients. A family representation provision might be worded as follows
(with my annotations in parentheses):
Rule 1.8(k): A lawyer may represent two or more family members in an action,
or engage in "family representation," where the following conditions are met:
(i) The representation is not prohibited by applicable law, (consistent with
Comment [16] to Rule 1.7), the parties are not directly adverse in litigation, and
the proceeding is not of the type which provides such a high risk of conflict that
family representation is unworkable (see Comment [1]);
(ii) The lawyer counsels all family members both at the outset and throughout
the representation as to the pros and cons of joint representation;
(iii) The lawyer's regular duties under other parts of these Rules apply to all
parties, including clients with diminished capacity under Rule 1.14, except as
provided in provision (iv) below;
(iv) The duty of confidentiality shall not apply between family member clients,
and the lawyer shall explain this to all the parties at the outset of the
representation;
(v) The lawyer takes any necessary steps to ascertain that the family members
are dealing fairly with each other, including those obligations consistent with the
need to protect the interests of clients with diminished capacity under Rule 1.14;
(vi) If the lawyer reasonably believes that one family member client is acting
so as to substantially injure another family member client, he shall cease the
communal representation and may take protective action permissible under these
Rules to safeguard the interests of the threatened family member; and
(vii) The lawyer is deemed to represent all family members in both their
collective and individual capacities for subsequent representation purposes.
Comment:
[1] The types of cases wherein the risk of conflict is so high that family
representation is unworkable include cases such as those identified as outright
288. This vision of family representation is based in large part on Professor Pearce's optional family
representation model. See supra notes 241-44 and accompanying text.
289. There are numerous practice standards apart from the Model Rules that provide helpful guidance for
attorneys representing children. See supra notes 29-31. The suggested amendments to the Model Rules are not
intended to overlook these important standards. Rather, I begin with the Model Rules because they cover the
broadest audience of attorneys, including those who typically represent parents, not children, in education cases.
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conflicts by ethics tribunals and professional standards, including the joint
representation of a parent and child in an abuse/neglect or custody case, or of a
husband and wife in a contested divorce proceeding.
[2] Necessary steps under (k)(v) may include, but are not limited to, verifying
with the family at the start of the representation what the decision-making
processes will be and regularly communicating with all family members in order
to ensure updated knowledge of their positions and their ongoing commitment to
the family representation process.
These changes are consistent with many other Model Rule provisions and will
ensure that family representation operates in as fair a manner as possible for all
parties. To this end, the lawyer must counsel each party at the outset about the
pros and cons of family representation and continue to do so throughout the
representation. This is akin to the attorney's current duty to explain joint
representation under Rule 1.7.290 Similar to the attorney's possible duty to ensure
that a guardian is acting in the interests of her ward,2 91 an attorney should only
engage in family representation if the family has clarified how information will
be communicated and decisions made. Moreover, the attorney must, at all times
during the representation, believe that the family members are dealing fairly with
each other.2 92 Professor Stephen Ellmann has noted this responsibility for
lawyers representing groups of any type, one that may incorporate mediation and
other alternative dispute resolution techniques.2 9 3 This also accords with
scholars' vision of a collaborative lawyering model, wherein the lawyer is
nondirective about the client's ultimate goals but directive as to the decision-
making process.29 4 To comport with these obligations, there should be no
delegation of participation available-each member should participate according
to his or her capacity-and the attorney should ensure that this occurs.
All the family member clients are entitled to diligent and loyal representation,
consistent with Comment 33 to Rule 1.7. Yet family representation cannot
properly occur when relevant information is kept confidential from certain
members. Thus the proposed Rule clarifies that there is no confidentiality among
members and that the attorney has a duty to keep all of the family members
informed, tailoring his disclosures and counseling to their varying capacities.295
An attorney should not engage in family representation where one party is acting
290. MODEL RULEs R. 1.7 cmt. 32.
291. See supra note 187.
292. Pearce, supra note 6, at 1311-12. Of course, this must take into account the varying capacities of the
family members.
293. See Ellmann, supra note 151, at 1152-57 (arguing that a lawyer for a group has an obligation to
"monitor the fairness of the group's decision-making processes, and if need be to intervene on behalf of those
who are becoming victims within the group itself").
294. Henning, supra note 9, at 315.
295. This limitation is consistent with Rule 1.7's outline of the obligations under joint representation. MODEL
RULEs R. 1.7 cmt. 31.
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so as to "substantially injure" another party.296 Because the child is the one
actually in the educational placement, it is most likely that the parent would be
the injuring party. If this arises, and the attorney cannot counsel the injuring party
out of the action, she must withdraw from representation and take any necessary
action to protect the potentially injured party, the child, consistent with existing
potential ethical obligations to third-party minors. 2 97 Finally, the Model Rules
should clarify that the family attorney represents all parties in both their
collective and individual capacity for subsequent representation purposes. 2 9 8
How would this work in practice? Let's return to the example in the
Introduction, where parents had enrolled their sixteen-year-old daughter with a
mild learning disability in a private school.29 9 The attorney engaging in family
representation would explain the process to the parents and child at the start of the
representation and would work with the family to identify common goals and
encourage productive communication among the parties. 3  Thus, the parents'
frustration with the child's out of school behavior might not even reach the levels
that it would under a different representation model. If it did, and the parents
sought placement in a restrictive residential behavior management school, the
attorney would be bound to interview the child and learn that she does not want to
attend. Some parents who send their children to residential behavioral facilities
do not know about the facilities' ineffectiveness or the abusive behavior of some
of its staff.3 0 1 A properly informed attorney looking out for the interests of both
parties would present the parents with this information and propose other
educational resources in the community that could both meet the child's needs
and address the parents' concerns about the child's behavior. He would also tell
the parents that such a program would not likely satisfy the least restrictive
environment mandate and that they would thus not be reimbursed for such a
school under the IDEIA. Many parents would be persuaded in such a scenario. If
the parents remained unconvinced, however, the attorney might be required to
withdraw but could also take protective action on behalf of the child. The court
would certainly not be left with the impression, as in the original example under
an individualistic representation system, that the child's and parents' interests
were aligned with the attorney representing both. With no court endorsement of
the placement and little chance of reimbursement, the parents would be unlikely
296. This standard is taken from Professors Cahn and Tuttle's model of expanded joint representation. See
Cahn & Tuttle, supra note 6, at 127-28 (noting that substantial injury can be financial or emotional, and that its
meaning will be "context-specific").
297. See supra note 187.
298. Pearce, supra note 6, at 1313.
299. See supra pp. 306-07.
300. These practices are consistent with the move towards collaborative lawyering by some in cases
involving families and children. See supra note 9.
301. See Maia Szalavitz, An Oregon School for Troubled Teens is Under Scrutiny, TIME, Apr. 17, 2009,
http://www.time.com/timelhealth/article/0,8599,1891082,00.html.
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to send the child to the residential school and thus harm to the child would be
avoided.
Of course, the family representation model will not work for all families.
Educational placements and family dynamics are complex. The needs of families
change over time and representation of children must take into account children's
gradual maturation. 3 0 2 I chose not to propose a default rule of family representa-
tion in order to increase choice for families and attorneys. Thus, these
amendments are meant to supplement existing options and serve as a first step in
orienting attorneys towards a more communal representation of families rather
than dictating one "right way."
CONCLUSION
Current legal doctrine views parents and children as a unified entity in
education matters, while the ethical rules governing attorneys are premised on a
solitary client model. This disjuncture would at first appear to call for a more
individualized representation model, wherein both parents and children have
their own counsel. Yet the reality is that the presumption is often correct, and
separate counsel for all parties to an education case is economically unfeasible.
This Article begins to address this paradox to better serve families and protect
attorneys by proposing a reconceptualization of representation and the attorney's
role. Family representation builds on a family's strengths and includes all parties
in a collaborative process. Thus, it increases children's voices-often ignored
under a system completely governed by the presumption-but also acknowl-
edges the unique relationship between parents and children. Family representa-
tion requires that the attorney focus on the family holistically, resulting in the best
outcomes for its members and better educational placements for children. Thus, it
has the potential to improve the representation of both parents and children. I
have applied family representation in the education context here, but family
representation also provides a valuable new approach to other types of cases
wherein parents and children have claims against the state or another third party.
Family relationships are complex yet durable, and a family is something more
than the sum of its individual members. It is time that attorney rules and practice
recognize these truths.
302. However, even children who are very young or incapacitated, if they are verbal, can benefit from a
respectful hearing from an attorney or factfinder. Buss, supra note 261, at 941-42.
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